To request a forensic service for biology, firearms, toxicology and/or trace evidence, you must first contact the Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) for authorization before you can submit an exhibit.
This guide assists police investigators with the collection, preservation, and shipping of physical evidence to the RCMP's National Forensic Laboratory Services (NFLS), which operates as a single public laboratory system with three sites located across Canada.
In addition to providing investigators with general information, this guide provides examples of some common exhibit types that are submitted to the different forensic service areas at NFLS – biology (DNA), toxicology, trace, counterfeit, and firearms. There could be other types of evidence not identified in this guide.
Basic guidelines and techniques
Collection
Local forensic identification service units may be called upon to assist with the collection of evidence. They have the proper tools and their members have undergone specialized training to ensure evidence is collected properly and safely. The following are some general guides, tips and best practices that can be used by investigators should forensic identification members not be available to assist.
Common tools and supplies for collecting evidence
Always use gloves and a mask
Common tools and supplies for collecting evidence
Tool
Generally used for
Additional information
Disposable scalpels
cutting stains from larger exhibits
scraping paint samples from vehicles (e.g. hit-and-run incidents)
if disposable tools are not available, rinse non-disposable tools between each use with alcohol or distilled water
Disposable tweezers and forceps
collecting small items (hair, building product particles, cigarette butts, etc.)
DO NOT use metal tools on ammunition components
Disposable lancet
collecting known DNA samples from individuals onto collection cards
found in the RCMP's DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kits (blue bags)
commercially available or from medical practitioner
soaking up liquid such as gasoline at an arson scene
it is preferable to use sterile, cotton swabs that are individually wrapped within a re-sealable paper or plastic sleeve
when collecting non-biological evidence, a best practice is to also submit an unused "control" swab (preferably from the same lot)
Sexual Assault Evidence Kits (SAEKs)
SAEKs are used to assist with the collection of evidence associated with sexual assaults – evidence is collected by trained health care professionals
police can submit requests for forensic analysis regardless of whether it is part of a SAEK
SAEKs are generally sealed by the health care practitioner when handed over to police
ensure the health care professional that is collecting the evidence provides you with a list of all the samples/exhibits in the SAEK because you will need to list all items on the request form (C-414) when submitting for analysis (alternatively, you may break the seal in order to itemize the available exhibits)
Forensic Blood Collection Kit
used for toxicological analysis of blood (e.g. cases of impaired driving)
contains two grey-stoppered vacuum tubes with a white powder that acts as preservative and anticoagulant
The RCMP has a kit and it is also available commercially
DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bag)
used for collecting known DNA samples for comparison purposes
there are three DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kits:
Blood Sample
Buccal Sample
Hair Sample
DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kits are not to be used for submission of samples to the National DNA Data Bank
blood samples are preferred for biology (DNA) analysis, followed by buccal (mouth swab) and then, hair.
the RCMP's DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kits are available to all police agencies, however, over versions are available by alternate service providers (the RCMP kits are identifiable by the blue bag used)
Convicted Offender DNA Database Sample Collection Kit (clear bag)
used to collect DNA samples from convicted offenders
specifically designed for the collection of DNA samples from convicted offenders
identifiable by the clear bag used
these are the only kits that will accepted by the National DNA Data Bank (NDDB) of Canada
to obtain these kits, contact the NDDB
Leak proof urine collection cup
used for toxicological analysis of urine (e.g. cases of impaired driving)
commercially available or from medical practitioner
Gunshot Residue (GSR) Kit
collecting GSR samples from persons suspected of recently discharging a firearm
collecting samples from objects suspected as having been exposed to a source of GSR, but cannot be easily submitted to the laboratory for analysis (e.g. a motor vehicle)
contains instructions, a collection form, and two boxes each containing a pair of disposable gloves, a label to re-seal the box after use, and two sample vials (also known as stubs)
obtain samples as soon possible after the shooting
do not collect GSR samples if the exhibit has been authorized for GSR testing at NFLS
complete the GSR Kit form at the time of sampling
include the GSR Kit collection form with your submission request by either sending the original along with the GSR Kit or sending an electronic copy by email with your Request for Analysis form (C-414)
contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Center to receive a GSR Kit
FTA collection card or Whatman 31 ET filter paper
collecting blood or buccal (mouth swab) samples from known individuals
the FTA Collection Card is found in the RCMP's DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bags)
Whatman filter papers are commercially available
Hemastix test strips
allows you to screen for the presence of blood
identifies if blood may be present, either human or animal
the strip should not come into direct contact with the material that is being collected
advise the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) if the Hemastix stip came in direct contact with an exhibit, stained surface or swab (so that FAC directs the exhibit to the appropriate area for DNA analysis)
Handling exhibits
Personal safety
Crime scenes and handling exhibits can be dangerous. Minimize exposure to infectious disease, hazardous drugs, and reduce the risk of contaminating the evidence by always wearing gloves and a mask when handling exhibits, including when you are collecting, packaging or shipping evidence. When finished, remove gloves and wash thoroughly with soap and hot water. Eye protection and other personal protection is also advised.
Avoid contaminating exhibits
Keep exhibits that need to be examined completely separate from each other, from different scenes, and from Comparison samples. Wear gloves at all times, changing them frequently (e.g. between exhibits and different areas of a crime scene). Avoid excessive handling of exhibits. Use a clean tool for each exhibit being processed. Use disposable tools such as scalpels whenever possible. Alternatively, clean all scissors and forceps thoroughly with alcohol between uses. Always package exhibits separately in clean bags or containers that will not leak, break or open. If accidental contamination is suspected, please inform the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre at the time of your submission.
Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is not a service provided by NFLS and is the responsibility of the investigator and agency. Your local forensic identification unit may provide this service or assist you in determining if the surface of the item is suitable for fingerprinting. Also, when conducting fingerprinting, avoid excessive handling of the exhibit, even while wearing gloves. Please note that if the exhibit requires both fingerprinting and other forensic services at NFLS, there is a recommended order and workflow. For example, fingerprinting and swabbing for DNA analysis are normally done prior to submitting firearm-related exhibits for firearm testing and examination. Contact the Forensic Assessment Centre for further guidance.
Large and small exhibits
For larger exhibits with visible staining that cannot be submitted to NFLS (e.g. bed mattress, large carpet), the stains of interest may be cut out when required. Using a sterile disposable scalpel, carefully cut out the area of interest ensuring to leave a sufficient border around the stain. When collecting truly small particles, such as hair or paint chips, it is best to fold them in a piece of paper and seal in an envelope or plastic bag.
Swabbing protocols for DNA
Danger
DO NOT swab knives or other items used on a person as a weapon. Properly package and submit any items used to cause injury or bodily harm directly to NFLS. If the object is too large, call the Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) for more information.
DO NOT swab clothing items or fabric, chewing gum, or cigarette butts as the DNA is difficult to recover. Properly package these exhibits and submit to NFLS.
Proceed
OK to swab all property crimes
OK to swab other offences with exhibits that cannot be easily submitted to NFLS and are expected to have ONE source of DNA (one person)
OK to swab blood, saliva or skin cells that are believed to be left on an exhibit (with the exception of fabric, chewing gum, or cigarette butts.
Warning
Fingerprint before swabbing since fingerprints may be wiped out during swabbing. Standard fingerprint technology does not interfere with analysis at NFLS, however, over handling the item may remove biological material.
Investigators may be required to collect biological samples for DNA analysis. Such material can be wet (e.g. a pool of blood), dry (e.g. dried blood stain on a carpet), visible (e.g. white stain, possible saliva/semen) or not visible (e.g. skin cells). In these situations, there are various collection methods available and different areas to swab that allow the highest potential to recover a DNA profile. Objects that have been handled by multiple individuals (door knobs or telephone receivers) are not recommended for forensic DNA analysis as they rarely yield useable information. See Figure 1: Common examples of some areas to swab that provide the highest potential of DNA recovery.
What is needed for swabbing
Cotton sterile swabs (ensure they are not expired) should be individually wrapped in paper or plastic. Some swabs have a plastic cap or tubes that allow the swab to dry within the package.
Disposable gloves
Mask that covers your nose and mouth
Sterile or distilled water preferably in a dropper bottle. If unavailable use bottled water.
How to swab
Wear mask and gloves, changing gloves between exhibits.
If swabbing at a location other than where the exhibit was seized, use a clean surface (e.g. clean with bleach). Considering covering the work area with clean durable paper.
Use one swab per area or stain (i.e. do not use two swabs for the same area/stain).
Swabbing a wet area (e.g. pool of blood, foods or other wet items): collect the DNA using a dry cotton sterile swab.
Swabbing a dry area (e.g. dried blood stain on carpet, tools, utensils, etc.):
With an eye dropper, dampen one side of a clean sterile swab with 1 or 2 drops of sterile or distilled water. DO NOT saturate. If distilled or sterile water is not available, use bottled or tap water.
Swab the area using the damp side first. Then, turn the swab over and swab the same area with the dry side.
Apply reasonable pressure when swabbing so that enough material is collected (particularly if the surface is textured). The swab should remain intact.
Avoid collecting excessive dirt/debris on the swab.
Dry and label appropriately.
Storing and drying swabs
DO NOT store moist swabs in airtight containers such as plastic bags or closed tubes. Moisture can lead to the growth of mold and bacteria which may limit the ability to obtain a DNA profile.
Some swabs come in self-drying containers so it is acceptable to return the damp swab to its container. DO NOT put container in a plastic bag.
When in doubt, or for swabs that require drying prior to packaging:
Use a drying cabinet or area with good ventilation where the swabs will not be touched or disturbed (to prevent contamination)
Ensure they are kept with their packaging to prevent mix ups
What to swab (and not to swab)
Following are some common exhibits showing what areas to swab that provide the highest potential of DNA recovery. In cases where an item is used as a weapon, DO NOT swab – send it "as is" to NFLS. More detailed information about the collection process for each of these exhibits is provided in the next section on collection and packaging "by exhibit type."
Figure 1: Common examples of some areas to swab that provide the highest potential of DNA recovery
DO NOT SWAB if item was used as a weapon and blood is thought to be present
Where to swab firearms and ammunition.
for possession and charges related to unsafe storage, use one swab to swab the grip and slide/action
DO NOT swab if the firearm was used as a weapon causing injury or death. Submit the firearm "as is" to NFLS
use one swab per group of cartridges casings or bullets of the same caliber found in close proximity
Where to swab tools. Swab the area that is touched most often.
use one swab to swab inside glove, and use a separate swab to swab outside glove
swab knife if used as a handled object (e.g. pry tool)
DO NOT swab knife or other tools/items if used as a weapon on a person
Swab anything large (e.g. floor wall, window glass, furniture). Use one swab per stain.
blood on floor
glass with blood on it
DO NOT swab fabric, textiles, clothing
Where to swab drinking containers, utensils and food – swab the area that may have saliva on it.
When swabbing food items, freeze the item first, if possible
Collecting comparison samples for DNA purposes
DNA analysis is based on a comparative process wherein a DNA profile that is obtained from an exhibit is compared to the DNA profile from a known person, from personal effects or discarded items. For all DNA samples submitted to NFLS for comparison, clearly indicate on the C-414 form whether a sample is from consent, from a warrant, or a discarded item. In all cases, always wear disposable gloves, even when collecting comparison samples.
From known persons, in order of preference
Blood
A blood sample can be collected using the RCMP's Blood Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bags), or a blood sample kit offered by another service provider.
Use the FTA collection card in the collection kit or a Whatman 31 ET filter paper to collect the blood. The FTA collection card or Whatman 31 ET filter paper are preferred methods to collect blood samples, however, liquid blood is accepted in most cases.
The collection of liquid blood must be performed by a healthcare practitioner who collects the blood in a lavender vacutainer tube, which contains preservatives and anti-coagulants.
The collection of blood from a deceased person is done at autopsy.
A buccal sample can be collected using the RCMP's Buccal Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bags), or a buccal sample kit offered by another service provider.
A hair sample can be collected using the RCMP's Hair Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bags), or a hair sample kit offered by another service provider.
If it is not possible to collect any of the above samples (e.g. individual is under surveillance), consider collecting and submitting personal effects or discarded samples for comparison purposes.
From personal effects and discarded items
Personal effects, such as a toothbrush, razor or hair brush, can be collected and submitted as Comparison samples. Personal items, usually from missing persons, are considered "quasi" knowns because it is not guaranteed that the object pertains solely to the user/owner of the item. As it relates to the personal effects of a known suspect, it is not possible to submit them as Comparison samples without consent or a court-ordered warrant.
Discarded items, such as gum, a cigarette butt or a drinking container, can be collected and submitted as Comparison samples, however, the act of discarding must be viewed by police. For example, the cigarette butt has to be seen by police as discarded by the suspect in order to be used as a comparison sample. Ensure that discarded sample is packaged, sealed and labelled separately and that the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
From a collection card using a dry stain
Use a FTA collection card or Whatman 31 ET filter paper and a disposable lancet to collect enough blood from a finger prick.
Gently squeeze the finger, causing the blood to drop on to the card, approximately the size of a quarter.
Allow the blood stain to dry completely. DO NOT fan the card or apply artificial heat to speed up the drying process (allow to dry naturally).
Package, seal and label each known sample separately.
Ensure the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
Collection cards are stored at room temperature before and after sample application.
Preservation and storage
The information below will assist in preventing the deterioration, unauthorized handling, loss, contamination and unnecessary alteration of exhibits during storage and prior to submitting exhibits to the RCMP's National Forensic Laboratory Services (NFLS).
Drying and storing exhibits
Ensure exhibits are completely dry especially when using plastic bags (some exceptions are noted below). If a drying cabinet is not available, allow wet or moist exhibits to dry naturally in a clean low traffic area prior to packaging. DO NOT hand fan, use electric fans, hair dryers or other heat sources to speed up the drying process as air currents and excessive heat may cause some loss of evidential material. Fully dried exhibits can be stored at room temperature provided it is not excessively hot or humid. The best storage for most exhibits is generally a freezer. If unavailable, use a fridge. If there is no fridge, you can store at room temperature, however, ensure the item is fully dried.
Exceptions:
DO NOT dry exhibits for arson investigations (e.g. fibre debris, suspect clothing). Arson exhibits should be packaged as soon as possible. See section on Fire Debris for more detailed information.
Liquid samples and human tissue (e.g. muscle, aborted fetus, and other moist exhibits) should be stored in a frozen state whenever possible. Refrigeration can be used if freezing is not an option. Submit the samples to NFLS as soon as possible.
Biological samples submitted for toxicological analysis should be refrigerated immediately and submitted as soon as possible to prevent the potential breakdown or loss of drugs (e.g., cocaine).
Common containers
Common containers
Type
Container style
Notes
Plastic
tamper-proof evidence bags
apply tamper proof seal as directed
if any gaps are present after sealing, tape or heat-seals can be used
already packaged exhibits (e.g. swab holders, exhibits in paper bags) can be put into tamper-proof evidence bags
plastic vials
suitable for collecting biological samples
suitable for solid evidence such as building product materials, paint chips, ammunition fragments, etc.
ensure lids are put on tightly – consider using tape to seal the lid in place
not recommended for some solvents (e.g. gasoline) as it can dissolve the plastic
liquid samples (urine, melted snow) may leak depending on the lid type
Nylon
special bags for packaging fire debris
100% nylon
air tight (must be properly sealed)
easy to puncture
commercially available
Glass
lavender vacutainer tubes
healthcare professionals, pathologists, coroners and other qualified medical professionals use these tubes to collect blood for DNA (please note dry stain collection is preferred to liquid blood sample)
contains an anti-coagulant
glass can break during shipping
grey-stoppered collection tubes
used for collecting samples that require toxicological analysis (blood, alcohol and drugs)
contains a special preservative and anti-coagulant
glass can break during shipping
glass containers with chemical resistant cap closures (e.g. canning jars)
rigid and puncture resistant
leak proof
ensure proper storage of empty canning jars – store them with their lids on and tightly closed
glass can break during shipping
glass vials with a chemical resistant screw-cap lid (teflon lined)
preserves liquid (acids, bases, solvents and fuels)
good for packaging solvents and caustic exhibits
have teflon-lined screw cap closures
air tight
glass can break during shipping
Metal
metal mailing tubes and ointment tins
ointment tins are suitable for hair or other types of non-biological trace evidence
NOT suitable for material from arsons
resistant to punctures or breakage during shipment
paint cans (new unused paint cans can be found at hardware stores)
lined cans are best for arson related exhibits
rust resistant and can prevent leakage of volatile compounds of interest during an arson investigation
Paper
paper bag
good option for shoes, which may be difficult to fully dry
suitable for packaging clothing (NOT suitable for clothing from arson suspects which must be packaged in an airtight container)
allows for moisture to breathe from the exhibit, reducing the chance of mould forming
difficult to seal properly
cardboard box
good packaging to place multiple sealed exhibits
helps ensure safe shipment and receipt of sharp exhibits, such as knives
use zip-ties to affix the sharp object inside the box for more effective contamination prevention – seal exhibit in a plastic bag prior to affixing to the box
Packaging and shipping
Proper packaging and delivery of exhibits to NFLS is critical. Improperly packaged exhibits can be a health hazard, may cause the exhibit to become contaminated or could even destroy the evidence. Improperly packaged exhibits might not be suitable for analysis and will be sent back to you by NFLS without further processing. Before submitting the exhibits, discuss packaging requirements with your local forensic identification services and/or the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC).
Sharp objects
Objects such as knives, syringes, glass must be packaged properly to ensure the object/exhibit doesn't puncture through packaging. For glass and other breakable items, ensure there is plenty of protective material used when packaging. Knives should be packaged in a knife box, or protected, secured and tied down in a box.
Dangerous goods
Follow Transport Canada's Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations: improper transportation of dangerous goods is an offence. For more information, contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) prior to shipping exhibits.
Ammunition
Firearms and unfired ammunition must be shipped separately.
For shipping of ammunition in amounts of less than 25 kgs., follow the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations. For this weight category, the shipping package must have a "1.4S" Transportation of Dangerous Goods (TDG) label attached to it and the shipping company/courier must be notified in writing (e.g. notation on the way bill) that the package contains a substance that is classified as "1.4S" for TDG purposes.
Ammunition must be packed in a strong container that is securely closed to prevent opening during transit. Cartridges must be properly cushioned and protected from accidental discharge.
Explosives
Contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) to obtain an explosive transport container. It is the only approved shipping container for non-initiated explosive samples. There are instructions provided with the explosive transport containers, including Teflon vials.
DO NOT place labels or tags over identifying marks or over areas that affect the operation of the firearm component. You can mark the container or affix a tag to the item, as required.
Firearms with broken stocks must be packaged properly to ensure the object/exhibit doesn't puncture through packaging. Ensure there is plenty of protective material used when packaging.
The container should not bear any markings on the exterior to indicate that it contains a firearm.
Firearms and unfired ammunition must be shipped separately.
An Ignitable Liquid Transport Container (ILTC) is recommended to safely transport ignitable liquids. These containers are equipped with an inner protective metal can and lid, absorbent material, exhibit bags and sample vials along with instructions.
Larger police agencies have their own ILTC. Other agencies should contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) to request an ILTC and provide the number of samples of suspected ignitable liquids you wish to submit for analysis.
An infectious substance is a micro-organism that is known or reasonably believed to cause disease in humans or animals. The infectious substance might be contained in blood, tissue, organs, body fluids, vaccines or cultures.
Place the exhibit container into a sealable plastic bag with absorbent packing material. Place this bag into another container strong enough to withstand transportation (e.g. a box).
Ensure sufficient packing material is present to impede the movement of the exhibit container without/within the outer container.
Proper closure
Inspect each layer of packaging to ensure they are properly closed and that at least one of the layers for each exhibit is sealed. Following are some examples of what constitutes a "sealed package":
evidence bag
heat-sealed plastic bags
vials or jars, sealed with tape
plastic or paper bags folded and sealed with sufficient tape
Proper labelling
Delays can be caused due to the improper identification/labelling of exhibits. To ensure your submission is processed promptly, please ensure that exhibit identifier listed on Form C-414 (Request for Forensic Laboratory Analysis) matches exactly to the exhibit identifier used on the actual exhibit. These identifiers should also match exactly to information found on each layer of packaging.
By exhibit type
Biological (DNA) analysis
1. Adhesive tape (DNA)
Fingerprinting on any adhesive tape-related exhibits must be done prior to submitting for DNA analysis. Contact your local forensic identification unit for fingerprinting services. Advise the person who is fingerprinting that DNA analysis will also be done and advise NFLS that the exhibit was first sent for fingerprinting.
DO NOT swab – submit as is.
Submit the tape for DNA analysis without removing it from the taped object, if possible.
If removal from taped object is necessary, handle ends of tape as little as possible to allow for possible DNA sampling. Place adhesive-side down onto a new document protector.
If cutting the tape is necessary to remove it from the object/person, mark the cut ends with permanent marker.
Do not separate or straighten pieces.
Package in tamper-proof evidence bags or rigid plastic or metal containers.
Do not package in paper or cardboard containers.
2. Airbag (DNA)
For cases involving injury of an individual, other than the driver, or in cases of death:
DO NOT swab. The entire airbag should be packaged and submitted to NFLS "as is" (without swabbing).
For crimes against property (e.g. stolen vehicles) or cases of impaired driving:
If blood is visible, swab the blood stain only.
If no blood is visible, divide the airbag into halves and swab each half separately (one swab per half). Swab from the centre outwards, to about 2/3 of the distance to the outside.
3. Bite marks (DNA)
When attempting to recover saliva or biological traces from a bite mark, use one swab over the bite mark. See swabbing protocols for dry area.
Only one swab is needed.
4. Blood (DNA)
Blood collected by healthcare professional
Blood from a deceased person is collected at autopsy by the pathologist/medical examiner or designated assistant. Consider asking for a buccal (from mouth) swab or pulled hair sample as back up. Deep muscle tissue, bone and/or teeth can also be considered.
Blood from a suspect or victim/complainant is collected by a healthcare practitioner (e.g. at hospital).
Blood samples should be refrigerated and submitted to NFLS as soon as possible.
Ensure all vials are properly sealed and labeled.
Note: A dry stain is preferred: request that the healthcare professional create a dry stain using a FTA collection card or Whatman 31 ET filter paper.
Blood collected by investigator
All necessary information and instructions for blood, buccal or hair samples are contained in the RCMP's DNA Warrant/Consent Collection Kits (blue bags). If a sample is being collected from a convicted offender, use the Convicted Offender DNA Database Sample Collection Kit (clear bag).
From a person by consent
Use a FTA card or Whatman 31 ET filter paper and a disposable lancet to collect the blood.
Allow the blood stain to dry completely.
Package, seal and label each known sample separately.
Ensure the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
From a person by warrant
DNA warrant legislation (sections 487.04 and 487.05 of the Criminal Code) (Form 5.02) allows for samples to be taken from suspects or accused individuals without their consent.
NFLS recommends using the RCMP's Blood Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bag), which has been prepared specifically for DNA warrant or consent sample collection.
Direct contact between Hemastix test strips and a biological stain may negatively affect certain DNA analysis procedures. Advise the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) if the Hemastix strip has come in direct contact with an exhibit, stained surface or swab so that the exhibit is directed to the appropriate areas for DNA analysis.
Blood stains on fabric or absorbent material (e.g. carpet, clothing):
If the item is large, cut out a portion, dry naturally, seal, label and submit. A swab can also be taken (see swabbing protocols). When swabbing suspected bloodstains, try to concentrate the stain onto the swab tip. Avoid swabbing excess background material (dirt, debris, paint, etc.) from the material being swabbed. Use one swab per stain.
Avoid scraping dry blood into envelopes. Dry blood may become airborne.
When possible, known samples should be collected using the RCMP's Buccal Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bag), which has been prepared specifically for DNA warrant or consent sample collection.
Swabbing the mouth allows for the collection of epithelial cells from the lining of the mouth.
Have the individual rinse his/her mouth with water twice before collecting the sample in order to remove excess saliva.
Use one dry sterile swab to thoroughly rub the inside of the cheeks, tongue and gums using an up and down motion.
Allow time for the swab to dry completely.
Package, seal and label each known sample separately.
Ensure the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
7. Cartridges / casings / bullets (DNA)
Swab multiple casings from the same group with a single swab
Spent cartridges should be swabbed together when thought to have originated from the same firearm (i.e. those of the same caliber found in close proximity).
8. Cigarette butts (DNA)
DO NOT swab cigartette butts
Use clean forceps or gloves to collect the cigarette butt, if possible.
If the cigarette butt is wet or damp, allow to dry completely.
DO NOT swab. Submit "as is".
Package, seal and label each item separately.
9. Clothing / fabric (DNA)
DO NOT swab fabric
DO NOT swab as the DNA is difficult to recover. Submit the item "as is" to NFLS.
Allow time for stains to dry completely. Applying artificial heat (e.g. blow dryer) may damage the biological sample. Not allowing to dry fully or properly can cause bacteria to form, leading to the degradation of the biological sample.
Handle each article of clothing separately.
If the item is large (carpet, bed sheet), consult with FAC.
Package, seal and label each article of clothing separately in paper bags.
10. Condoms (DNA)
If intact, place a knot at open end to seal contents and submit to the laboratory as soon as possible.
If broken or ripped, allow the condom to dry as much as possible and package, seal and label separately in a paper bag before submitting to the laboratory.
Keep the intact or broken condom frozen, if possible.
11. Drinking containers / straws (DNA)
Skin cells can be located on drinking containers such as coffee cups, pop cans, milk/juice cartons, coffee lids and/or straws.
Swab the area where skin cells are thought to be present as this provides the highest potential of DNA recovery (see diagram). Use one swab. See swabbing protocols.
12. Envelopes and stamps (DNA)
Whenever possible, submit the entire envelope to NFLS.
Ensure that the envelope is dry before packaging.
In cases where the envelope requires both fingerprinting and forensic DNA analysis, have the exhibit fingerprinted prior to its submission to NFLS. Advise the Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC).
If handwriting analysis will be taking place (via private examiner), this may need to be done prior to fingerprinting. Ensure the examiner takes all necessary contamination prevention precautions.
If the exhibit is required for other document examination, please specify this on form C-414.
13. Aborted fetus (DNA)
When the abortion of the fetus has just occurred, the products of conception should be sent to NFLS as soon as possible.
Refrigerate and ship immediately.
DO NOT freeze products of conception unless the sample was already frozen at the time of the seizure. If already frozen, it should be kept frozen (avoid freeze-thaw-freeze).
Package on ice and send to NFLS as soon as possible using expedited transport
It is preferable not to place in formalin/formaldehyde or any other preservative.
14. Fingernail (DNA)
Material from under the fingernail should be collected when the victim/complainant indicates that he/she scratched the assailant. Samples are collected from each hand separately.
Swabbing fingernails is preferred, however, clippings are acceptable depending on the case.
Swabbing fingernails
Place two separate sheets of paper on a working surface where the swabbing will take place.
Use one swab per hand.
Moisten one side of a sterile swab with saline water (if not available, use distilled water or tap water).
Place the victim/complainant's right hand over one of the pieces of paper and swab the area under each of the fingernails using the damp side of the swab. Turn the swab and go over the same areas with the dry side.
Place the swab in its packaging, ensuring that it is properly closed and labelled right hand.
Carefully fold the piece of paper to enclose any debris.
Place the swab and folded paper in an envelope or container marked right hand.
Repeat for left hand.
Clipping fingernails
Place two separate sheets of paper on a working surface where the clipping will take place.
Place the victim/complainant's right hand over one of the pieces of paper and clip the nails as close as possible to the fingertip using clean scissors or clippers.
Fold the piece of paper with the clippings and place in a clean container.
Label the container right hand.
Repeat for left hand.
15. Firearms (DNA)
DO NOT swab a firearm if its discharge caused injury or death.
Use one swab per firearm. One swab can be used on different areas of the same firearm.
DO NOT swab the firearm if its discharge caused injury or death – properly package and submit the firearm to NFLS for swabbing.
If the firearm is a handled object, it is acceptable to swab. The general rule is to use one swab on different areas of the same firearm.
for possession and charges related to unsafe storage, use one swab to swab the grip and slide/action
for possession and charges related to unsafe storage involving more than one firearm, NFLS will accept up to 4 swabs per investigation (one per firearm)
All cartridges found from within the magazine may be swabbed using one swab.
Skin cells can be located on items such as utensils used for food.
Swab the area where skin cells are thought to be present as this provides the highest potential of DNA recovery (see diagram). Use one swab. See swabbing protocols.
When possible, known samples should be collected using the RCMP's Hair Sample Warrant/Consent Collection Kit (blue bag), which has been prepared specifically for DNA warrant or consent sample collection.
Collect approximately 6-8 pulled scalp hairs with root sheaths. DO NOT cut hair.
Place the hair in a folded sheet of paper and place in another appropriate container (envelope or plastic bag).
Package, seal and label each known sample separately.
Ensure the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
From unknown source
In the event a hair or hairs are found at a crime scene, there may be an opportunity to submit these as exhibits for DNA analysis.
Place the hair in a folded sheet of paper and place in another appropriate container (envelope or plastic bag).
Package, seal and label each sample separately.
Ensure the origin of the sample is clearly marked.
19. Human remains (DNA)
If decomposition is minimal, routine Comparison samples should be taken at autopsy. Consult with the coroner.
If decomposition is extensive, have the following samples taken at autopsy:
A sample of deep muscle tissue (about an inch cube) – DO NOT put tissue in formalin or any preservative
Sample of bone including the marrow (about 3 to 4 inches long), preferably from a long bone or from a rib
A few teeth, preferably molars
Freeze sample(s) as soon as possible and keep frozen until submitted to NFLS.
Note on bone and/or teeth samples: Bone samples must be pulverized before sending to NFLS. Contact FAC to obtain a list of service providers that offer bone pulverization services.
20. Knife (DNA)
DO NOT swab if used on a person as a weapon causing injury or death. Package knife "as is" and submit to NFLS.
Swab if knife has been handled (e.g. used as a pry tool).
DO NOT swab the knife if it has been used on a person as a weapon – properly package and submit the knife to NFLS for swabbing. See Packaging and shipping of sharp objects.
If the knife is a handled object (e.g. used as a pry tool), the handle should be swabbed. When swabbing the handle, swab both sides using one swab.
21. Semen (DNA)
Semen from a victim/complainant (DNA)
The healthcare practitioner will use a Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) or equivalent to collect the samples required from the victim or complainant.
SAEKs are generally sealed when handed over to police. Ensure the health care professional that is collecting the evidence provides you with a list of all the samples/exhibits in the SAEK because you will need to list all items on the request form (C-414) when submitting for analysis. Alternatively, you may break the seal in order to itemize the available exhibits.
Semen from items at a crime scene (DNA)
Semen stains can be found on the surface of objects or items (e.g. bedding, carpet).
When dealing with an object that can be seized (e.g. clothing, bedding) and semen is thought to be present, DO NOT swab. Submit to NFLS as is.
When dealing with an object that cannot be seized (e.g. wall, floor) and semen is thought to be present, swab the area and submit to NFLS. DO NOT swab fabric surfaces. Cuttings from areas of interest can be taken from fabric surfaces.
DO NOT swab fabric, cigarette butts, chewing gum as the DNA is difficult to recover. Package and submit "as is" to NFLS.
DO NOT swab if there is possible blood present and submit "as is" to NFLS.
Some common types of items where skin cells may exist include Break and Enter tools, jewelry, and cell phones.
Swab the item where it is handled most.
Use one swab.
23. Tools / weapons (DNA)
DO NOT swab tools or weapons that have been used on a person to cause injury or death.
Swab handled objects to determine if biological evidence exists. Use one moist swab per stain. Swab both sides of textured area as a single swab.
DO NOT swab a tool or weapon that has been used on a person to cause injury or death – properly package and submit the tool or weapon to NFLS for swabbing.
If the tool or weapon is a handled object (and not used on a person), the handle should be swabbed separately.
Carefully package the ends of tools to prevent loss of foreign material.
Use plastic bags or styrofoam cups over the ends to prevent further damage to the tool and to retain any foreign material.
Send tools in a tightly-packed box to prevent movement.
1. Bank notes and negotiable instruments (counterfeit)
Under Section 462 of the Criminal Code, the National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau (NACB) has been delegated authority to be the central repository and point of disposition of all counterfeit money, counterfeit cheques and other negotiable instruments.
All suspect counterfeit bank notes (Canadian, US and foreign currency) must be submitted to the NACB for examination and destruction.
Before conducting a printing plant search, investigators are encouraged to contact the NACB to discuss the case and establish a list of items to seize.
All counterfeit exhibits are submitted directly to the NACB.
2. Coins (counterfeit)
Submit all suspect counterfeit Canadian circulation coins to the National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau (NACB) for examination.
Submit all suspect counterfeit and/or payment cards to the National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau (NACB).
Forensic specialists may choose to examine a sampling of exhibits in large case submissions.
Investigators should consult with counterfeit examiners at the NACB before sending seized equipment to the laboratory, including embossing machines encoders and tipping machines.
DO NOT activate, adjust or alter equipment.
Place payment cards and related printing materials in separate document protectors or plastic or paper envelopes.
4. Travel and identification documents (counterfeit)
Suspect travel and identification documents include government issued identification such as passports, immigrations forms, citizenship cards, driver's licences, health cards and social insurance cards.
Computers and equipment should go to technological crime units
DO NOT move, unplug or alter the equipment.
DO NOT allow the suspect (or other user) access to the computer.
Ask the user to provide you with usernames and passwords, but do not attempt to login.
Contact your local technological crime unit for assistance.
When seizing, collect all wires, cables and related items.
Modern printers may store electronic data relevant to an investigation. To prevent the possible loss of evidence, contact your local technological crime unit for assistance.
Check if the printer has a ribbon. Used ribbon can be submitted to determine if impressions of the questioned text can be found.
If the printer has interchangeable type elements, collect them all.
Comparison sample: Obtain samples of correspondence from files which were produced by the same equipment on or about the date of the questioned document, if possible. Label and place samples in paper envelopes.
If no blood is thought to be present on ammunition components, consider having a forensic identification specialist swab them. If blood is thought to be present, it is preferable to submit the relevant ammunition component to NFLS for swabbing.
Contact your local forensic identification unit to arrange for the fingerprinting of cartridge cases, cartridges and firearms prior to submitting to NFLS.
Unfired ammunition (firearms/toolmark)
Any cartridge found in the chamber of a firearm should be itemized/packaged as a separate exhibit.
Once removed from a magazine, unfired ammunition MUST be itemized/packaged as a separate exhibit. DO NOT attempt to load back into the magazine.
Unfired ammunition MUST be packaged/shipped separately from firearms.
Includes the submission of cartridge cases, shotshells, shot pellets, shotshell wads, etc.
All ammunition components must be itemized/packaged as separate exhibits.
DO NOT use metal tools to remove bullets from bodies or objects (i.e. walls).
Bullets, shot pellets, shotshell wads, etc. removed from bodies should be rinsed with water and dried before packaging.
It is not necessary to remove ALL the shot pellets from a body. A representative sample will be sufficient for examination at NFLS.
For shipping, wrap in tissue or some type of padding to prevent excessive movement
Indicate "biohazard" on the Form C-414 if there is biological material present on the item.
Note: Bullets or bullet fragments can often be located by X-rays. X-rays should be taken of a body or exhibit as projectile fragments may remain in the body even when both entrance and exit wounds have been identified. Most medical or veterinary facilities have X-ray equipment which can be used for locating projectiles in small objects. This would prevent the loss of forensically significant evidence and allow for the removal of small fragments with minimum damage.
2. Bone and cartilage (firearms/toolmark)
Wounds on bone and cartilage may be examined to determine if the tool being submitted was used to inflict the damage.
The medical examiner or pathologist will excise the bone or cartilage containing the wound
To preserve toolmarks on cartilage and bone, tissue samples are submerged in a (0.9%) saline solution.
Refrigerate or freeze and send to NFLS as soon as possible.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes, such as suspect tools.
3. Clothing (firearms/toolmark)
Firearms analysis on articles of clothing can be submitted for impact damage assessment and range determination.
When clothing is submitted for range determination it must be accompanied by photographs of the associated wounds and an autopsy report (if available at the time of submission).
Avoid excessive handling of the clothing to ensure residue is not lost or transferred to other parts of the item.
Collect only the outer layer of clothing that has possibly been penetrated by the projectile(s) or were in close proximity to the bullet path.
Protect the area near the bullet hole and other areas suspected of bearing firearms discharge residue from contamination or contact with other parts of the clothing.
Package each item of clothing separately to prevent a transfer of residue.
Allow wet or moist clothing to dry naturally before packaging. Not allowing items to dry fully or properly can cause bacteria to form. Do not use a blow dryer.
Use paper bags to package clothing to prevent mould.
Indicate "biohazard" on the C-414 for the exhibit if there is biological material present on the item.
4. Firearms (firearms/toolmark)
Fingerprinting or swabbing for DNA on any firearms related exhibits must be done prior to submitting to the firearms section.
The Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) database can cross-reference firearms with fired ammunition components. Only CBSA firearms seizures can be directly submitted to the IBIS Section. You must first obtain authorization by the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) to submit fired ammunition components to IBIS.
Unload and affix proper identification tags to the trigger guard of the firearm.
DO NOT use adhesive labels, especially if the firearm is to be fingerprinted. These can remove the fingerprints.
DO NOT handle or manipulate the firearm in any way that would affect testing at NFLS. This includes, but is not limited to:
test firing (for legal classification and functionality)
disassembly
trigger pull
shock discharge
serial number restoration
NFLS will not conduct testing that has already been attempted by another laboratory or law enforcement agency.
Contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) if the firearm was recovered from water or if the exhibit is excessively soiled. Exposure to air will initiate the corrosion process so it is preferable to keep the firearm submerged or covered in the medium (e.g. water, mud, soil) from which it was discovered and shipped to NFLS in that state. If that is not possible, the firearm can be cleaned as follows:
Rinse with boiling water to flush off foreign material
Allow to dry naturally
Apply lubricant to metallic surfaces to protect against corrosion
DO NOT use pull-throughs, brushes or other cleaning devices to clean the barrel or other metallic parts of the firearm
Ensure the firearm is unloaded and safe for handling before shipping. A visible securing device should be used through the action (e.g. zap-strap, triggerlock).
If a firearm and magazines are seized together, these should be itemized/packaged as one exhibit.
If there is biological material present on the item, indicate "biohazard" on Form C-414.
Ensure that firearms are transported in accordance with all federal and provincial regulations and adhere to the shipping policies of the courier company that is being used.
5. Gunpowder / primer caps (firearms/toolmark)
Keep gunpowder in its manufacturer's container, when possible.
Avoid contact with flame, excessive moisture, etc.
An explosive transport container is the only approved shipping container for non-initiated explosive samples.
For an explosive transport container or for more information about transporting dangerous goods or other items, please contact FAC prior to shipping exhibits.
6. Obliterated serial number (firearms/toolmark)
NFLS does not conduct serial number restoration if one has been previously attempted using chemical (acid) etching or heat recovery techniques.
If the item is difficult to transport, contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Center to determine if a firearm specialists is available to attend the scene and conduct the restoration on site.
7. Tools (firearms/toolmark)
Includes knives, bolt cutters, screwdrivers, pliers, saws, etc.
DO NOT try to fit or place the tool in the toolmark. Keep tools isolated from the toolmarks that you suspect to be linked.
Carefully package the ends of tools to prevent loss of foreign material.
Use plastic bags or styrofoam cups taped over the ends to prevent further damage to the tool and to retain any foreign material.
Send tools in a tightly-packed box to prevent movement.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes.
8. Toolmark impressions (firearms/toolmark)
DO NOT try to fit or place the tool in the toolmark. Keep tools isolated from the toolmarks that you suspect to be linked.
Protect toolmarks from damage
If possible, the object bearing the toolmark should be submitted.
If the toolmark cannot be removed, contact FAC for advice on making casts of the toolmark.
If the toolmark cannot be removed and casts of the toolmark are not possible, remove portions of the exhibit containing the toolmarks. Clearly mark the toolmarks generated during the removal process.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes, such as tools.
9. Tires (firearms/toolmark)
It is not necessary to submit the entire tire.
Cut an area around the puncture or slash.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes, such as the item used to puncture the tire.
10. Wires (firearms/toolmark)
Wires can be submitted and submitted to NFLS for analysis.
Using some masking tape, identify the end that you cut - there is no need to mark or identify the suspicious end.
DO NOT cover the suspect end with tape.
Cover the suspicious end with loose protective packing.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes.
Toxicology
1. Blood (toxicology)
Blood samples from a deceased will always be collected by a pathologist/medical examiner or designated assistant. Ensure the blood is obtained from an intact vessel (e.g. femoral vein). Pooled samples such as cavity fluid, pericardial fluid or chest blood should be avoided. Trauma to and/or decomposition of the body may require the submission of additional samples (e.g. heart blood, liver, vitreous humour, stomach contents).
Blood samples from a suspect or victim will always be collected by a healthcare practitioner (e.g. at hospital).
Advise the healthcare practitioner that the blood is being collected for toxicological analysis.
Where possible, a Forensic Blood Collection Kit should be used. If unavailable, collect blood using two 10 mL grey-stoppered vacuum tubes.
Grey-stoppered vacuum tubes contain anti-coagulants and preservatives. After the tube is sealed and labeled, invert the grey-stoppered vacuum tubes gently several times to mix contents.
Samples taken at hospital (including serum/plasma) may be seized by warrant and submitted to NFLS for testing.
Blood samples should be refrigerated and submitted to NFLS as soon as possible as some drugs can break down during storage.
Ensure all vials are properly sealed and labeled.
Note on blood being submitted for drug-facilitated sexual assault:
For alcohol analysis, blood samples collected more than 24 hours after the incident will not be accepted.
For drug analysis, blood samples collected more than 72 hours after the incident will not be accepted.
2. Food and beverages (toxicology)
Food and beverage samples may be submitted for testing for alcohol, drugs or poisons.
Collect in a leak proof container, seal and label.
Store refrigerated and submit to the laboratory as soon as possible. Some drugs may break down during storage.
Comparison sample: Submit a known comparison sample, where possible (for example, a sealed bottle of the same brand of wine).
3. Liver (toxicology)
Approximately 25 grams of liver tissue should be placed in a leak-proof container, sealed and labeled by the pathologist or coroner.
Do not use a fixative or submerge the liver in any liquid.
Refrigerate the sample and submit to NFLS as soon as possible as some drugs can break down during storage.
4. Stomach contents (toxicology)
A sample of stomach contents should be placed in a leak-proof container by the pathologist or coroner.
Refrigerate the sample and submit to NFLS as soon as possible as some drugs can break down during storage.
5. Syringes, pipes, powders, drugs, or drug residue (toxicology)
Drug paraphernalia can include syringes, pipes, powders, tablets/capsules, or other residues. These can be found at the scene and can be collected and submitted for analysis.
For sharp objects (e.g. syringes, pipes) package each item in a rigid puncture-resistant container, seal and label.
For powders, tablets or capsules, place in a plastic or glass vial, seal and label.
All drug paraphernalia should be treated as biohazardous and labeled as such.
Liquids should be collected in a leak-proof container.
6. Urine (toxicology)
Urine samples should be collected in a leak proof urine collection cup. Ensure cups are sealed, closed tightly and labeled.
Urine samples can also be collected in 10 mL grey-stoppered vacuum tubes, sealed and labeled.
Fill urine containers only ¾ full to avoid leakage during transport.
If using a Doxtech™ Urine Specimen Collection Kit, disregard instructions that ask you to place the label inside the container. The label should be affixed outside the container.
For alcohol analysis, urine samples collected more than 24 hours after the incident will not be accepted.
For drug analysis, urine samples collected more than 72 hours after the incident will not be accepted.
Samples must be refrigerated and sent to NFLS as soon as possible as some drugs can break down during storage.
7. Vitreous humour (toxicology)
Vitreous humour refers to the transparent jellylike tissue filling the eyeball behind the lens.
The medical examiner will collect the vitreous in a 10 mL grey-stoppered vacuum tube.
Ensure the contents are sealed and labelled.
Refrigerate the sample and submit to NFLS as soon as possible.
The information in this section is only for samples of liquids that are suspected to be ignitable liquids. For information about testing other materials for the presence of ignitable liquid residue (e.g. fire debris, clothing, empty containers, etc.) See Section 10, fire debris (trace analysis).
For small amounts of liquid found in a container (e.g. jerrycan or solvent bottle), transfer the liquid to a new glass vial with a chemical resistant screw-cap lid (Teflon-lined).
For large amounts of liquid, transfer 5 - 10 mL into a new glass vial with a chemical resistant screw-cap lid (Teflon-lined).
For empty containers suspected of containing an accelerant (e.g. empty jerrycan or bottle), package in an approved air-tight container in the same manner as for fire debris. See Section 10, Fire debris (trace analysis).
If a swab (e.g. gauze pad) is used to soak up a liquid at a fire scene, package the swab in a new metal paint can, or glass canning jar as described in Section 10, fire debris (trace analysis). An unused swab should also be packaged separately and submitted as a control sample.
Package and ship suspected ignitable liquids separately from any samples of fire debris or clothing that are to be examined for ignitable liquid residue.
DO NOT store samples of suspected ignitable liquids in a conventional refrigerator or freezer. Vapor leakage could produce an explosion set off by the compressor motor.
Comparison samples: All liquid samples must be packaged separately from any clothing or fire debris samples that may also be submitted.
2. Adhesive tape (trace analysis)
Fingerprinting on any adhesive tape related exhibits must be done prior to submitting for trace analysis. Contact your local forensic identification unit for fingerprinting services. Advise the person who is fingerprinting that trace analysis will also be done and advise NFLS that the exhibit was first sent for fingerprinting.
Tape from a crime scene may be compared to a roll of tape associated with the suspect or to pieces of tape from other scenes.
Submit the tape for analysis without removing it from the taped object, if possible.
If removal from taped object is necessary, handle ends of tape as little as possible to allow for possible physical matching. Place adhesive-side down onto a new document protector.
If cutting the tape is necessary in order to remove it from the object/person, mark the cut ends with permanent marker.
Do not separate or straighten pieces.
Package in tamper-proof evidence bags or rigid plastic or metal containers.
Do not package in paper or cardboard containers.
Comparison samples: In tamper-proof evidence bags, submit all partial rolls and pieces of tape that are similar in size, colour and texture. Do not mark or handle ends.
3. Bank dye packs (trace analysis)
Exploding bank dye packs are used by some banks to identify bank robbers. Disguised as a pack of bank notes, the pack is passed to a bank robber by the bank teller. Using a transmitter, the pack detects when the robber has left the bank and then it will emit a large cloud of red smoke and dye which will stain the bank notes, the robber's clothing, etc.
Use extreme caution when handling these dye packs to prevent contamination.
To avoid contamination, dye samples from suspects and those from the scene should be collected by different investigators.
Samples from the scene should be double-bagged in tamper-proof exhibit bags and submitted separately from samples from suspects.
Large surfaces such as the interior of vehicles can be swabbed using a gauze or cotton-tipped applicator that is wet with rubbing alcohol (isopropanol), methanol or acetone. If none of these solvents are available, then water may be used.
Allow time for swabs to dry completely before packaging.
Ensure that dye packs are made safe (i.e. no unexploded secondary packs, etc.) before moving exhibits or obtaining swabs.
4. Building products (trace analysis)
Fragments of building products, such as drywall, caulking, or tar may be found on clothing, tools, and vehicles, etc.
Collect a comparison sample from the scene
DO NOT attempt to remove particles from clothing or tools – submit these items "as is".
Collect particles from larger objects, such as vehicles, and submit in leak-proof containers, such as plastic vials with tightly sealed lids or metal tins.
Comparison samples: Comparison samples should be collected from the damaged area(s) of the building. Package separately in leak-proof containers. Mark container as comparison sample.
5. Clothing (trace analysis)
Clothing with paint or other foreign particles (Trace analysis)
Wear a protection suit to prevent contamination – change suits for each suspect.
Ensure the floor where the individual will undress is clean.
Have each individual stand on a double stack of paper (at least two sheets) when removing clothing.
Handle each item of clothing separately – take care to prevent any transfer of material between exhibits.
Take care not to shake off any trace evidence adhering loosely to the garment.
Ensure that fallen particles are captured on pieces of paper placed underneath the exhibits.
If clothing is wet or moist, allow time for it to dry completely before packaging. Air-dry wet clothing from different individuals in separate rooms. DO NOT air-dry if the clothing is from an arson suspect and is to be tested for the presence of an accelerant.
Package, seal and label each article of dry clothing separately in tamper-proof evidence bags or new, brown-paper evidence bags.
Describe the location of any observed stains of interest on the accompanying Form C-414. DO NOT place any marks directly onto the clothing.
Also submit the upper sheet of paper where the individual was standing. Carefully fold the paper to retain loose debris. Package and label it in a separate sealed tamper-proof evidence bag or new, brown paper evidence bag. Discard the bottom sheet of paper that was in contact with the floor.
If articles of clothing have been packaged together (e.g. when removed at hospital), leave them all together – do not repackage separately.
If space is not available, wet exhibits may be packaged in tamper-proof evidence bags and submitted immediately to NFLS. Indicate on Form C-414 that the clothing is wet.
Clothing exhibits may also be frozen prior to submission.
Clothing from arson investigation (suspected ignitable liquid residue)
Immediately place clothing in large wide-mouth (2 L) canning jars or large (1-10 gallon) clean metal cans (new paint cans can be found at a local hardware store), or in a nylon bag. DO NOT package the clothing in paper bags, as these do not provide an air-tight seal which is required for fire debris analysis.
If using nylon evidence bags, secure with an air-tight heat-seal. Rolling down the top of the bag at least six times and then securing with packing tape will also provide an air tight seal.
DO NOT air-dry if the clothing will be tested for the presence of ignitable liquids (e.g. solvents, fuels, or other volatiles). If the clothing is wet, seal it in a plastic bag (air tight seal) and freeze to prevent microbial action that will consume the ignitable liquids and retard mould growth.
Freeze the clothing prior to submission, if possible.
Note: Paper bags and ordinary plastic bags are not suitable for exhibits that are to be examined for the presence of accelerants.
Clothing with pepper spray/tear gas
Allow clothing time to dry completely.
Package, seal and label each article of clothing separately in tamper-proof evidence bags or unused brown-paper evidence bags.
Fuel marking dyes are available for marking gasoline or diesel storage tanks and can assist in identifying the theft of fuel from these bulk storage tanks. The dye is not visible and will not harm internal combustion engines.
To obtain the dye, contact FAC with the following information:
Type of fuel
Volume of fuel to mark
Number of times the volume is to be marked
The location of the fuel tank
After the fuel has been stolen, the investigator can seize a sample of fuel and:
test it in the field for an immediate result (there is a procedure to make the dye visible)
If swabs have been collected, at least two clean (unused) swabs must also be submitted for analysis as control samples.
Be alert for damaged metal fragments, tape fragments, pieces of wire, shredded explosive wrappers (paper or plastic), clock mechanism parts, fuse, and/or battery parts – collect these and package each separately.
Contact your nearest Explosive Disposal Unit (EDU) so that the scene can be searched for secondary explosives and/or hazardous devices (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear).The scene must be declared safe before entry or exhibit collection.
Have your local forensic identification services and the EDU locate the seat of the blast and collect debris and/or swabs from this location.
Following the instructions of the EDU or forensic IDENT, search outward from the seat of the blast in a systematic pattern and collect debris showing signs of explosive or heat damage. Large objects or surfaces too big to collect are swabbed for residue.
Certain items can be sent to NFLS for both explosives and DNA examination, in particular fragments that a suspect may have handled (e.g. container fragments, tape, device concealment packaging, switches or string). Such items should be packaged to preserve the priority evidence. If DNA is the priority, the exhibit should be packaged in a paper bag first, then inserted inside a sealed air-tight container.
When possible, place debris in air-tight containers (e.g. canning jars, nylon evidence bags and lined metal cans).
Comparison samples: Certain samples or items seized from two separate scenes may be suitable for comparison and must always be packaged separately.
Any debris or samples or items collected from a post-blast crime scene must always be packaged separately.
Any samples or items collected from suspect or residences must be packaged and kept separate from post-blast scene debris and samples.
Non-initiated explosives from a scene or seized elsewhere (suspect or residence) can be sent in the same Explosive Transport Container (ETC).
Contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre to ask a specialist to triage and identify what samples or items can be compared or not, where they should be sent, and for what type(s) of examinations (physical match, explosive analysis, etc).
8. Explosive devices (trace analysis)
DO NOT touch.
Contact the nearest Explosives Disposal Unit (EDU) to render the device safe. Live devices will not be received / examined by NFLS.
Once the device is rendered safe, device components (e.g. power sources, timing units, wires, blasting cap, tape) should collected and seized as post-blast evidence. Device components may be examined by local EDU.
Contact the nearest Explosives Disposal Unit (EDU) for assistance in determining the stability of the suspected explosive substance.
The explosives transport container (ETC) is the only approved shipping container for non-initiated explosive samples.
When sending non-initiated explosives to NFLS using the following procedure:
Contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) to obtain a ETC
Following the instructions that come with the ETC, use the vials provided and package the explosive in 1-2 teaspoon quantities per vial.
Suspected peroxide explosives must be diluted or slurried with 1:10 with isopropyl alcohol (rubbing alcohol).
Complete the documentation exactly as indicated in the instructions provided with the ETC and ship to NFLS by courier.
Note: If you are uncertain of the stability or hazards associated with an unknown substance, contact the FAC and request a specialist to advise you on safe handling and desensitization procedures before touching the substance.
10. Fire debris / ignitable liquid residue (trace analysis)
The information in this section is only for materials suspected to contain ignitable liquid residue (e.g. fire debris, clothing, empty containers). For information about testing samples suspected to be ignitable liquids, see Section one, accelerants / ignitable liquids (trace analysis).
Place fire debris in clean, lined metal cans or in wide-mouth canning jars or in nylon bags. Unlined metal cans are also suitable but they are prone to rusting and run the risk of not being airtight upon arrival at NFLS. The can or jar must be unused, direct from supplier with lid on. If submitting debris in the canning jar, ensure the rubber seal on the lid of the jar is not inverted.
DO NOT re-use other types of jars, such as pickle or jam jars.
Large exhibits that cannot be reduced to fit into canning jars or paint cans may be packaged in nylon bags or other special bags sold for packaging fire debris.
Cut up large pieces of debris and fill container one-half to two-thirds, leaving at least 3 to 5 cm of space at the top of the can or jar free of debris.
DO NOT dry exhibits before packaging.
Properly packaged exhibits may be stored in an explosion-proof refrigerator or freezer prior to submission.
Package and ship separately from suspected ignitable liquids.
If a swab (e.g. gauze pad) is used to soak up a liquid at a fire scene, package the swab in a new metal paint can, or glass canning jar as described above. An unused swab should also be packaged separately and sent in as a control sample.
11. Gunshot residue (trace analysis)
Only use an approved GSR sample collection kit sent to you by NFLS.
Follow all the instructions that come with the GSR kit.
Collect samples from the hands and face of a suspect as soon as possible using an approved GSR sampling kit.
Do not collect GSR samples if the exhibit has been authorized for GSR testing at NFLS.
When collecting articles of clothing from suspects, submit outermost layer of clothing only. Ensure that each item is packaged separately in paper bags.
NFLS WILL NOT accept the following exhibits:
GSR samples from the face and/or hands of suspected shooters more than twelve hours (>12 hrs) after the shooting incident
GSR samples taken anywhere from a shooting victim
Articles of clothing from shooting victims
Contact the NFLS Forensic Assessment Center to request additional Gunshot Residue (GSR) Kits
12. Metals (trace analysis)
Request an elemental analysis to determine sample composition and possible sources (e.g. metal filings, metal fragments from fire and explosion scenes).
Submit suspect samples in tamper-proof exhibit bags.
For metallurgical examinations (e.g. metal fatigue), contact FAC to provide a potential list of metallurgists.
Comparison samples: Submit Comparison samples in tamper-proof exhibit bags.
13. Paint (trace analysis)
During an investigation, you may come across paint in three different forms:
vehicle paint – NFLS can provide make/model and year information from paint left at a crime scene such as a break and enter (where a car smashed through a door, gate, wall, etc.) or a hit and run scene from vehicle parts left at the scene, or on a pedestrian's clothing, bicycle etc.
architectural paint – NFLS can conduct comparisons of:
paint transferred to an object (e.g. door, window) from a painted tool; and
paint transferred to a tool from an object on which the tool was used
spray paints – NFLS can compare spray paint on a vandalized wall or vehicle (e.g. graffiti epitaphs at homicide scenes) to a spray paint can seized from the suspect.
If foreign paint is present on an object, submit the entire object to NFLS. If it is not practical to submit the entire object, DO NOT attempt to separate the foreign paint from the surface of the object. Instead, cut out a portion of the object around the foreign paint and submit to NFLS. If the object is too large to submit or the object cannot be cut, remove the foreign paint and include any underlying paint layers as one sample.
Remove each paint sample with a new, disposable scalpel, being careful to obtain all layers of paint present.
Submit scalpel with the sample.
Package each sample in a piece of folded paper, a leak-proof metal canister, or a plastic vial. Place inside a sealed canister, plastic evidence bag or envelope.
Submit parts of the damaged material if possible, especially if smearing is present (e.g. bumper extensions, parts of door frames).
Submit entire articles of clothing when paint smears are suspected.
DO NOT use adhesive tape to lift paint or to store a sample of the paint.
Submit liquid paint samples in paint tins or place on a glass slide, dry and submit.
Comparison samples: Take separate paint samples from all damaged areas of vehicles, buildings (e.g. door frame), fences, posts, safes, etc. Use a new scalpel for each sample and package each sample separately, as described above, taking care to avoid contamination between samples. Include the VIN, make, model and year of each vehicle sampled and the location of each sample.
14. Physical match (trace analysis)
A physical match between two objects can provide conclusive links between a suspect and a crime scene. For example, motor vehicle parts left at a hit and run scene may be physically matched back to a suspect's vehicle; or, a piece of tape recovered from a victim of a home invasion may be physically matched back to a roll of tape in the suspect's possession.
NFLS may provide assistance in the physical matching of a variety of materials, including adhesive tapes, plastic parts, large paint chips, glass containers, or metal foil.
Carefully package broken material in leak-proof containers in such a way that protects the edges.
There are specific instructions for packaging adhesive tape seized from a crime scene. Refer to Adhesive Tape.
Comparison samples: Include rolls of tape, plastic parts, paint chips, glass containers, metal foil, or other materials believed to be the source of the questioned item(s). Package separately from questioned samples and ensure that edges of the item(s) are protected from further damage. Refer to Adhesive Tape for instructions on correct packaging.
15. Safe insulation (trace analysis)
Safe insulation is a light, easily fractured mortar-like material used by safe manufacturers. Often safes are broken into by cutting into the wall of the safe. Cutting through the wall of safe will release the safe insulation causing particles to be dispersed on the suspect's clothing, tools, vehicle, and/or residence. Many of the particles of safe insulation will be microscopic and so the suspect may not even be aware that they are present.
Package materials containing suspected samples of safe insulation – such as clothing, footwear, vehicle, floor mats, and tools – in tamper-proof evidence bags or new, brown-paper evidence bags.
For suspected safe insulation material found on larger objects, such as vehicle interiors, truck beds, or truck liners, manually recover as much material as possible and package in tamper-proof evidence bags or new, brown-paper evidence bags.
Refer to clothing and tools for packaging instructions.
Comparison samples: Collect samples of safe insulation from each damaged area of the safe. Package in leak-proof vials or tins, and seal in tamper-proof evidence bags. Keep separate from clothing and tools. Include information about make, model, year and serial number of the safe on Form C-414.
16. Tools (trace analysis)
Tools may be used to pry or cut an object at a crime scene, including screwdrivers, pry bars, pliers, bolt cutters, knives, and saws. Paint may be transferred from a door, window, safe, etc. to a tool, and/or paint from a tool may be transferred to the object being pried or cut open.
Carefully package the ends of tools to prevent loss of foreign material.
Use plastic bags or styrofoam cups taped over the ends to prevent further damage to the tool and to retain any foreign material.
Send tools in a tightly-packed box to prevent movement.
Comparison sample: Collect associated items for comparison purposes.
17. Unknown liquid or powder (trace analysis)
Contact FAC for instructions on how to process suspected CBRN materials.
Submit in glass vials or bottles with Teflon-lined screw cap closures (wide-mouth sample containers can be purchased).
Submit the entire sample unless it exceeds 250 grams (about 1 cup) of solid material or 500 mL (about 2 cups) of unknown liquid.
If only a small amount of powder is available, for example, powder mailed in an envelope, do not attempt to remove the powder from the envelope. Package entire envelope and its contents in a leak proof plastic evidence container or bag.
USE glass containers to store possible CBRN materials.
DO NOT use metal cans, plastic vials or plastic bags to sample possible CBRN materials.
Decontaminate the outside of the sample container after filling and before packaging for submission by wiping it with a towel moistened with water or rubbing alcohol.
Seal all samples in a tamper-proof evidence bag.
18. Vehicle parts (trace analysis)
Caution: If airbags did not deploy during the collision, they are still armed and could deploy when you lean into the car, causing injury or death.
If a physical match is to be attempted from parts left at a scene to a suspect vehicle, protect the broken ends of molding, aerials, lens, trim, etc. Refer to Physical Match.
Note on fingerprints: Almost all exhibits, including firearms or ammunition, could have fingerprints. Fingerprints should be processed before the exhibit is sent to the RCMP's National Forensic Laboratory Services (NFLS). If a fingerprint examination is needed, consult with your local forensic identification unit before submitting exhibits. Some possible exceptions include exhibits where trace evidence could be lost with fingerprinting.
Contact the Forensic Assessment Centre
All requests for service to NFLS must go through the Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC) for authorization prior to the submission of exhibits. The only exception is for counterfeit submissions, which go directly to the NFLS National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau.
Following is a general outline of the submission process:
Complete service request Form C-414, Request for Forensic Laboratory Analysis. It can be found by RCMP members on RCMP Forms or contact NFLS. Other checksheets or forms may be required depending on the investigation.
Send the completed Form C-414 and other applicable checksheets or forms to FAC by email (preferred) FAC-CEJ@rcmp-grc.gc.ca or by fax 1-877-243-5047.
A FAC representative will contact you to authorize the service request or discuss the file. This may include discussion about exhibit selection and prioritization of exhibits.
The National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau
Submit suspected counterfeit bank notes, negotiable instruments, travel and identity documents and payment cards directly to the National Anti-Counterfeit Bureau (NACB). Depending if the evidence is required in court will determine what form to complete.
When evidence is required for court:
Complete service request Form C-414, Request for Forensic Laboratory Analysis. Provide details of the occurrence and a clear indication that the analysis is required for court purposes. Specify date of court proceedings, if known.
To avoid interfering with the forensic examination, do not place any markings on the exhibits (e.g. never write 'counterfeit' or 'fake' on any exhibit).
If fingerprint analysis is needed, submit exhibits to the NACB first and indicate special handling is required. (Note: all fingerprinting must be done at your location).
Please ensure that you include your email address.
Seal exhibits in an exhibit bag and mark with initials and date.
Forward your exhibits along with a copy of Form C-414 to the NACB.
Results for all banknote submissions include: a laboratory report; a Certificate of Examiner of Counterfeits and/or an affidavit; and a Notice of Intention to Produce Certificate and/or an affidavit.
When no criminal charges are anticipated:
When no criminal charges are anticipated and there are no suspects identified at time of submission, exhibits will be processed as a "non-court" submission.
Complete form 3774 (contact NACB@rcmp-grc.gc.ca for the form) and provide details of the occurrence.
Forward your exhibits along with a copy of Form 3774 to the NACB.
Note: All non-court submissions are retained at the NACB for a minimum period of 6 months after which they are destroyed. If a suspect is identified during the retention period, please notify the NACB and notes will be treated as evidence for court.
To submit NACB exhibits:
By courier, registered mail or priority post National Anti-Counterfeiting Bureau NPS Building 73 Leikin, Ottawa ON K1A 0R2
Post forensic analysis
Return of exhibits and master files
All master files, reports, documentation and exhibits examined by NFLS belong to the submitting agency. NFLS returns all exhibits to the agency, including all NFLS generated sub-samples (e.g. DNA extracts, swabs). Exceptions include:
exhibits consumed in analysis and uninitiated explosives.
ammunition components are retained in archive for possible future comparison to cases linked via CIBIN matches (if ammunition components are required for court purposes, it is your responsibility to contact the NFLS FAC to initiate exhibit return.
the National Anti-Counterfeting Bureau (NACB) assumes responsibility for destroying all counterfeit notes (when the notes are no longer needed or are not required for court).
Retention of exhibits by investigating agency
NFLS does not retain exhibit material, master files, reports and related documentation beyond two years. Once exhibits are returned to the investigating agency, NFLS will have limited information available to conduct future analysis.
It is the agency's responsibility to ensure retention of exhibit material, master files and related documents according to its policies. If further forensic examination is required, it is the responsibility of the lead investigating agency to submit and/or re-submit exhibits and related documentation for further analysis.
Disclosure
Disclosure of NFLS documents prior to the return of the exhibit to the submitting agency can be requested by contacting the Forensic Assessment Centre (FAC). In consultation with the Crown Attorney, complete the Request for Disclosure form.
NFLS requires 30 days' notice in order to provide documents. Please use the latest request form.
Other forensic resources
This guide pertains exclusively to National Forensic Laboratory Services (NFLS), however, investigators should be acquainted with other local points of reference and forensic services that are available to them. Following are some additional resources to consider:
National DNA Data Bank of Canada
The National DNA Data Bank (NDDB) stores DNA profiles recovered from crime scenes and from convicted offenders. When investigators submit biological (DNA) evidence to NFLS, the DNA profiles developed from the crime scenes are uploaded and compared within the NDDB.
Convicted offender biological samples are collected and submitted directly to the NDDB. To ensure the integrity of the NDDB, the DNA Identification Regulations stipulate that the NDDB can only accept a biological sample that has been collected with a Convicted Offender DNA Database Sample Collection Kit (clear bag). For more information, contact the NDDB.
To request an NDDB sample collection kit, please contact the NDDB.
NDDB DNA collection kits are available for blood, buccal or hair samples.
The use of any other collection kit will cause the sample to be rejected.
RCMP Detachments may also contact Divisional Stores directly.
Forensic identification units
Forensic identification is an area that provides essential support to criminal investigations, including bloodstain pattern analysis, crime scene examination for physical evidence such as fingerprints, and footwear or tire impressions. Specialists in these units can attend crime scenes or can be called upon to provide advice on the collection and packaging of evidence. Refer to your local point of contact.
Technological crime units
Technological crime units assist investigators with forensic analysis on various pieces of equipment such as computers, smart phones, tablets or other sophisticated technical products. Refer to your local point of contact.
Explosives disposal units
Explosive disposal units provide expertise in relation to the handling of explosives and the investigation of post blast scenes. They can assist in the examination and rendering 'safe' of suspicious packages and improvised explosive devices including the disposal of military ordinance and ammunition. Many units are responsible for first response to CBRN-E (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives) events. Refer to your local point of contact.
Firearms reference table
The Firearms Reference Table (FRT) is produced by the Canadian Firearms Program and incorporates both text and images, which aids investigators in the identification of firearms. For assistance, contact the Canadian Firearms Program.
National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
The National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST) offers personnel and resource support to law enforcement agencies across the country on all aspects of firearms investigations and prosecutions. Refer to your local/regional point of contact.
National Centre For Missing Persons And Unidentified Remains (NCMPUR)
Fentanyl drug labs: Awareness for landlords and rental services
Unlike other clandestine drug labs, those used for producing illicit fentanyl tend to be smaller due to the extreme toxicity. Make-shift drug labs are increasing in numbers in Canada and they have been found just about anywhere: in rented homes and apartments, motel rooms, rental trucks, abandoned buildings, barns and garden sheds.
Be alert for signs of a potential fentanyl drug lab operation, including:
Unusual amount of white or coloured powder on walls, floors, countertops, furniture, clothes dryer and/or vent
Unusual thumping sounds that could indicate a pill press machine
Chemical odours - often a strong vinegar smell
Tenants reluctant to allow landlords to inspect the property
Payment of rent in cash
Surveillance cameras
Curtains always drawn
Exhaust fans running at odd times. Residents may wear filtration masks, safety glasses or other protective equipment. May remark that they are "painting".
Illicit fentanyl labs are time bombs filled with poisoned air and large amounts of contaminates. Those living around them – sometimes including children unfortunately – can suffer severe health consequences. After a facility is contaminated, it may be considered an environmental hazard; remediation and clean-up may be the responsibility of the owner and not covered by insurance.
How to protect your property:
Obtain a credit history
References should be mandatory and followed up
Check the property regularly
Look for signs or indicators
Any suspected clandestine fentanyl lab requires a response by trained law enforcement officers wearing proper personal protective equipment. If you suspect drug lab activity, leave the area immediately. Do not investigate. Do not enter the premise. Contact your local police.
Laboratoires de fentanyl : Conseils aux propriétaires et aux services de location
Contrairement aux laboratoires clandestins voués à d'autres drogues, ceux où se produit du fentanyl illicite sont souvent petits, en raison de l'extrême toxicité du produit. Les laboratoires clandestins se multiplient au Canada et on en trouve dans des maisons louées et des logements, dans des chambres de motel, dans des camions loués, dans des immeubles vacants, dans des granges et dans des remises de jardin.
Soyez à l'affut des indices d'un possible laboratoire de fentanyl :
Poudre ou poussière en quantité inhabituelle sur les murs, les planchers, les comptoirs et les meubles
Cognements répétitifs inhabituels qui pourraient trahir l'utilisation d'une presse à comprimés
Odeurs de produits chimiques
Réticence du locataire à laisser entrer le propriétaire pour inspecter les lieux
Loyer payé comptant
Caméras de surveillance
Rideaux continuellement tirés
Fonctionnement de ventilateurs à des heures indues
Ces laboratoires sont des bombes à retardement. L'air y est toxique et contaminé par de grandes quantités de fines particules. Les voisins – parfois des enfants, malheureusement – peuvent voir leur santé se détériorer gravement. Le lieu contaminé peut être considéré comme un danger pour l'environnement. La décontamination et la remise en l'état seront la responsabilité du propriétaire et ne seront pas remboursées par les assurances.
Comment protéger vos propriétés :
Consultez le dossier de crédit des futurs locataires.
Exigez des références et consultez-les.
Vérifiez les lieux régulièrement.
Restez à l'affut des signes et des indices.
Seuls des agents de l'application de la loi dûment formés et équipés pour leur protection personnelle devraient intervenir sur les lieux d'un laboratoire clandestin de fentanyl. Si vous soupçonnez la présence d'un laboratoire clandestin, quittez les lieux immédiatement. N'enquêtez pas. N'entrez pas. Communiquez avec votre service de police.
Missing persons
In any given year, between 70,000 and 80,000 people are reported missing to police in Canada. While most are found within seven days, missing persons cases can be extremely stressful for family and loved ones.
Missing persons cases are an operational priority for the RCMP. We've developed a national strategy to:
The health and safety of Indigenous women in our communities is a priority for the RCMP. We are working with our partners (including Indigenous organizations) to bring about change.
Learn more about the RCMP's partnership to reconstruct the faces of 15 unidentified human remains.
Personnes disparues
Chaque année, de 70 000 à 80 000 personnes sont portées disparues auprès des services de police du Canada. La majorité de ces personnes sont retrouvées dans les sept jours, mais il n'en reste pas moins qu'une disparition peut être extrêmement stressante pour la famille et les proches.
Les disparitions sont une priorité opérationnelle pour la GRC, qui a élaboré une stratégie nationale visant à :
rendre des comptes;
forger des partenariats solides avec d'autres organismes;
Aidez-nous à retrouver les personnes disparues en consultant les nombreux profils sur Disparus-Canada et en apprenant comment transmettre des renseignements.
La santé et la sécurité des femmes autochtones dans nos collectivités sont une priorité pour la GRC. Nous collaborons avec nos partenaires (y compris des organisations autochtones) dans le but de changer les choses.
Ce guide propose de l'information générale sur le programme et sur le rôle que les traces d'ADN peuvent jouer dans une enquête sur une personne disparue.
Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada
CSSPO
Centre de service des systèmes de la Police opérationnelle
DPI
Dirigeant principal de l'Information
GRC
Gendarmerie royale du Canada
LCJ
Loi sur le casier judiciaire
PAG
Plan d'action de la gestion
PE
Protocole d'entente
PVR
Plan de vérification axé sur les risques
SCICTR
Services canadiens d'identification criminelle en temps réel
SDDA
Sous-direction du développement des applications
SDSM
Sous-direction de la sécurité ministérielle
SIRP
Système d'incidents et de rapports de police
SIRPP
Système d'incidents et de rapports de police protégé
Sommaire
En tant que service de police national, la GRC détient une grande quantité de renseignements personnels dans ses bases de données opérationnelles, ses bases de données administratives, ses bases de données du personnel et ses dossiers physiques. Dans l'exécution de son mandat, la GRC est tenue par la loi de protéger, conserver et, le cas échéant, de supprimer ces renseignements. En 2011, le Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada (CPVP) a effectué une vérification pour examiner les politiques, les systèmes, les contrôles administratifs et les mesures de protection qu'utilise la GRC pour protéger les renseignements personnels contenus dans les bases de données du Centre d'information de la police canadienne (CIPC) et du Système d'incidents et de rapports de police (SIRP). La vérification a relevé des lacunes dans la gestion des renseignements personnels entreposés dans ces bases de données. Le CPVP a formulé six recommandations, dont cinq visaient le SIRP, le système de signalement d'incidents principal de la GRC. Plus précisément, la vérification a révélé que des renseignements personnels étaient conservés plus longtemps que nécessaire dans le SIRP, la capacité de surveiller les opérations des utilisateurs et de faire enquête était limitée, les comptes d'utilisateur du SIRP ne faisaient pas l'objet d'examens réguliers, il n'existait aucun processus d'examen pour assurer le respect des politiques et des procédures régissant l'utilisation du SIRP, et il n'existait aucun processus pour retirer le droit d'accès aux dossiers liés aux condamnations ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation (on parle maintenant de suspension du casier). La sixième recommandation portait sur le besoin de signer des ententes officielles avec les services externes ayant accès au CIPC.
En avril 2014, le commissaire a approuvé une vérification de la sécurité des renseignements personnels dans le cadre du Plan de vérification axé sur les risques (PVR) pour 2014-2017. Les objectifs de la mission comprenaient un suivi pour évaluer les progrès réalisés en fonction des recommandations formulées dans le rapport du CPVP de 2011 et un examen des contrôles semblables régissant l'utilisation du Système d'incidents et de rapports de police protégé (SIRPP).
La présente vérification permet de conclure que la GRC a effectivement donné suite à la majorité des constatations et recommandations du CPVP. Cependant, la GRC peut faire davantage pour renforcer la sécurité des renseignements personnels contenus dans ses bases de données opérationnelles en améliorant les activités de surveillance et de contrôle de la conformité du SIRP et du SIRPP. La GRC devrait aussi revoir les procédures existantes relatives aux dossiers ayant fait l'objet d'une suspension du casier judiciaire (réhabilitation), en ce qui a trait au caviardage des dossiers physiques, pour s'assurer que les divisions utilisent un processus efficace qui répond aux exigences prévues par les lois fédérales pertinentes.
La réponse de la direction contenue dans le présent rapport témoigne de la détermination des cadres supérieurs à donner suite aux constatations et aux recommandations qui ressortent de la vérification. Un plan d'action détaillé sera élaboré. Une fois ce plan approuvé, la Vérification interne de la GRC en surveillera la mise en œuvre.
Réponse de la direction à la vérification
Services de police contractuels et autochtones
Les Services de police contractuels et autochtones souscrivent aux constatations et aux recommandations dans le cadre du suivi de la vérification du Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée sur la sécurité des renseignements personnels. Des mesures ont été prises pour évaluer les pratiques existantes visant à surveiller l'accès des utilisateurs au SIRP et le respect des politiques régissant l'utilisation du SIRP, et un plan d'action sera élaboré pour renforcer les mesures prises pour réduire et atténuer les risques en matière d'accès non autorisé et de non-conformité. Il s'agira peut-être d'examiner la mise en œuvre éventuelle de processus automatisés ou manuels à l'échelle nationale ou divisionnaire. Un plan d'action détaillé sera élaboré d'ici juin 2016 et fera état d'échéances et de jalons précis que devra respecter la GRC.
Les Services de police contractuels et autochtones appuient la recommandation visant le retrait en temps voulu de données du SIRP de façon à respecter la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Cette recommandation exige la collaboration du sous-commissaire aux Services de police spécialisés, du dirigeant principal de l'Information et du sous-commissaire à la Police fédérale, de qui relèvent les politiques et la conformité du SIRPP depuis 2016. Une réunion sera convoquée d'ici avril 2016 pour confirmer auprès des divers intervenants leur contribution à l'élaboration du plan d'action et à l'établissement d'un outil d'examen du journal de transactions semblable à ce qui existe pour le SIRP.
Byron Boucher, s-comm. intérimaire Services de police contractuels et autochtones
Services de police spécialisés
En général, les Services de police spécialisés (SPS) approuvent les constatations et les recommandations dans le cadre du suivi de la vérification du Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée sur la sécurité des renseignements personnels. Des mesures ont été prises pour aider les Services de police contractuels et autochtones à évaluer les exigences techniques pour la mise en place d'un processus d'examen visant la conformité des utilisateurs avec les politiques et procédures régissant l'utilisation du SIRP. En outre, les SPS travailleront directement avec les représentants de la Police fédérale pour activer et maintenir dans le SIRPP les fonctions de suppression qui existent dans le SIRP. Enfin, les SPS ont commencé à évaluer les possibilités d'améliorer le processus actuel de caviardage des dossiers physiques. De façon générale, les SPS ont entamé l'évaluation des besoins, des coûts et des défis connexes relativement à l'élaboration d'un plan d'action détaillé.
Peter Henschel, s.-comm. Services de police spécialisés
1. Contexte
En tant que service de police national, la GRC détient une grande quantité de renseignements personnels dans ses bases de données opérationnelles, ses bases de données administratives, ses bases de données du personnel et ses dossiers physiques. Dans l'exécution de son mandat, la GRC est tenue par la loi de protéger, conserver et, le cas échéant, de supprimer ces renseignements.
On entend par « renseignements personnels » tout renseignement factuel ou subjectif au sujet d'une personne identifiable. Il peut s'agir de renseignements sous forme numérique sauvegardés dans des bases de données ou des systèmes de gestion de l'information ou de renseignements sous forme physique figurant dans des fichiers ou des dossiers. À la GRC, une quantité importante de renseignements personnels recueillis dans le cadre d'activités policières est entreposée sous forme numérique dans les systèmes opérationnels suivants : le Centre d'information de la police canadienne (CIPC), le Système d'incidents et de rapports de police (SIRP) et le Système d'incidents et de rapports de police protégé (SIRPP). Le CIPC est exploité par la GRC pour le compte de la collectivité canadienne d'application de la loi. Le CIPC fournit de l'information sur les crimes et les criminels. Il s'agit du seul système d'information national mettant en contact les partenaires du système de justice pénale et de l'application de la loi au pays et à l'étranger. Le SIRP est le principal système de gestion des dossiers opérationnels utilisé par la GRC dans toutes les provinces sauf la Colombie-Britannique.Note de bas de page 1 Le SIRP sert à conserver la trace de tous les aspects d'une enquête policière, depuis le signalement de l'incident jusqu'à la conclusion définitive si l'affaire est portée devant les tribunaux. Il contient de l'information sur les gens qui ont été en contact avec la police en tant que suspects, victimes, ou témoins. Le SIRPP est la base de données principale utilisée pour le stockage, la recherche et la gestion de renseignements touchant les enquêtes criminelles relatives à la sécurité nationale. On y enregistre aussi, au besoin, le renseignement criminel classifié et d'autres informations portant sur des dossiers de nature délicate.
La protection des renseignements personnels à la GRC est une responsabilité collective qu'assument activement divers groupes. Au moment du suivi, le Centre de service des systèmes de la Police opérationnelle (CSSPO), qui relève des Services de police contractuels et autochtones (SPCA), était chargé des politiques et de la gestion de l'accès des utilisateurs du SIRP et du SIRPP. Relevant du Secteur du dirigeant principal de l'Information (DPI), la Sous-direction de la gestion de l'information (SDGI) donne des conseils et des directives sur la disposition de dossiers et la conservation de dossiers ayant une valeur archivistique. Enfin, le Centre d'information de la police canadienne (CIPC), au sein des Services de police spécialisés (SPS), est responsable de la gestion du système du CIPC.
En 2011, le Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée (CPVP) a effectué une vérification pour examiner les politiques, les systèmes, les contrôles administratifs et les mesures de protection qu'utilise la GRC pour protéger les renseignements personnels contenus dans les bases de données du CIPC et du SIRP. La vérification avait relevé des lacunes dans la gestion des renseignements personnels qui y étaient entreposés. Plus précisément, la GRC n'avait pas conclu de protocoles d'entente (PE) avec tous les services externes ayant accès au CIPC pour régir l'utilisation du système et la protection de renseignements personnels qui y étaient enregistrés. En ce qui a trait au SIRP, les problèmes suivants avaient été relevés : des renseignements personnels y étaient conservés plus longtemps que nécessaire, les comptes d'utilisateur ne faisaient pas l'objet d'examens réguliers, la capacité de surveiller les opérations des utilisateurs et de faire enquête était limitée, et il n'existait aucun processus d'examen pour assurer le respect des politiques et des procédures régissant l'utilisation de renseignements personnels.
En avril 2014, le commissaire a approuvé une vérification de la sécurité des renseignements personnels dans le cadre du Plan de vérification axé sur les risques (PVR) pour 2014-2017. Les objectifs de la mission comprenaient un suivi pour évaluer les progrès réalisés en fonction des recommandations formulées dans le rapport du CPVP de 2011 et un examen des contrôles semblables régissant l'utilisation du SIRPP.
2. Objectif, portée et démarche
2.1 Objectif
La vérification visait à déterminer si les processus mis en place pour protéger, conserver et supprimer les renseignements personnels détenus à des fins opérationnelles assurent le respect des délais prescrits, s'ils sont efficaces et s'ils sont conformes aux politiques établies.
2.2 Portée
La vérification consistait à faire un suivi des mesures prises en réponse à la vérification effectuée par le CPVP en 2011. La vérification du CPVP portait sur la sécurité des renseignements personnels contenus dans le CIPC et le SIRP, mais cette vérification visait aussi les contrôles mis en place par la GRC pour protéger les renseignements personnels versés dans le Système d'incidents et de rapports de police protégé (SIRPP).
La vérification a été effectuée en fonction de la définition de renseignements personnels et des exigences législatives relatives à leur protection énoncées à l'article 6 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. La vérification portait sur les renseignements personnels conservés à des fins opérationnelles en format électronique et papier. La vérification ne visait pas à confirmer si les renseignements personnels détenus par la GRC étaient exacts ou complets, ni à évaluer l'incidence éventuelle de ces renseignements sur la prise de décisions par la direction.
2.3 Méthode
La planification de la vérification a pris fin en juillet 2015. Au cours de cette phase, l'équipe de vérificateurs a procédé à des entrevues, à une revue générale des processus, à l'examen des politiques, directives et procédures pertinentes et à l'analyse des résultats de vérifications antérieures.
Les critères et les procédés de vérification ont été élaborés en fonction des constatations de vérifications antérieures et des exigences relatives au traitement de renseignements personnels prévues par la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels, la Loi sur le casier judiciaire et les politiques de la GRC. L'objectif et les critères de vérification sont présentés à l'Annexe A.
Au cours de la phase d'examen, qui s'est terminée en novembre 2015, les vérificateurs ont eu recours à diverses techniques, dont la conduite d'entrevues, l'examen de documents et l'observation physique. À la fin de la phase, l'équipe de vérificateurs s'est réunie avec le personnel pour valider les constatations et a informé la haute direction.
2.4 Énoncé de conformité
La mission de vérification est conforme aux Normes relatives à la vérification interne au sein du gouvernement du Canada, comme en font foi les résultats du programme d'assurance et d'amélioration de la qualité.
3. Constatatoins
La Vérification de certaines bases de données opérationnelles de la GRC effectuée en 2011 par le Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée (CPVP) avait relevé des lacunes dans la gestion des renseignements personnels entreposés dans les bases de données opérationnelles de la GRC. Le CPVP a formulé six recommandations, dont cinq visaient le SIRP, le système de signalement d'incidents principal de la GRC. Plus précisément, la vérification a révélé que des renseignements personnels étaient conservés plus longtemps que nécessaire dans le SIRP, la capacité de surveiller les opérations des utilisateurs et de faire enquête était limitée, les comptes d'utilisateur du SIRP ne faisaient pas l'objet d'examens réguliers, il n'existait aucun processus d'examen pour assurer le respect des politiques et des procédures régissant l'utilisation du SIRP, et il n'existait aucun processus pour retirer le droit d'accès aux dossiers liés aux condamnations ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation (on parle maintenant de suspension du casier). La sixième recommandation portait sur le besoin de signer des ententes officielles avec les services externes ayant accès au CIPC.
La direction a accepté les constatations de la vérification et les recommandations formulées, et s'est engagée à prendre des mesures immédiates pour corriger les problèmes soulevés par le CPVP. Nous nous attendions donc à voir une amélioration des pratiques de gérance visant la protection des renseignements personnels. Plus précisément, nous recherchions les résultats suivants :
la signature d'ententes officielles avec tous les services ayant accès au système du CIPC;
l'examen régulier du droit d'accès et de l'activité des utilisateurs des bases de données opérationnelles de la GRC;
l'examen régulier des opérations d'utilisateurs internes et externes du SIRP pour assurer le respect des politiques et des procédures;
l'isolement ou le retrait (élimination) de renseignements du SIRP tel que prescrit par la loi.
Nous avons constaté que la GRC a donné suite à cinq des six recommandations formulées dans le rapport de vérification du CPVP de 2011. La recommandation visant l'adoption par la GRC d'un processus d'examen fournissant l'assurance que tous les utilisateurs respectent les politiques et les procédures régissant l'utilisation des renseignements personnels enregistrés dans le SIRP n'a pas encore été mise en œuvre. Outre les recommandations découlant de la vérification du CPVP, nous avons relevé d'autres possibilités d'amélioration : renforcer l'examen régulier des comptes d'utilisateur du SIRP, étendre les améliorations du SIRP à d'autres bases de données opérationnelles et élaborer une stratégie plus efficace pour l'isolement de renseignements personnels dans les dossiers physiques.
3.1 Centre d'information de la police canadienne
Le CIPC a établi des outils pour communiquer efficacement aux utilisateurs ses attentes et les dispositions de protection des renseignements personnels.
Lors de sa vérification de certaines bases de données opérationnelles de la GRC en 2011, le CPVP a constaté que la GRC avait élaboré et mis en œuvre des politiques et des procédures pour protéger les renseignements personnels des Canadiennes et Canadiens qui sont sauvegardés et consultés dans le système du CIPC. Puisque des partenaires externes et d'autres organismes d'application de la loi accèdent au CIPC, la GRC avait établi des protocoles d'entente (PE) pour leur souligner les modalités d'utilisation, y compris les dispositions de protection des renseignements personnels. Le CPVP a constaté que la GRC n'avait pas établi de PE officiels avec environ 25 % des services de police qui ont accès au CIPC. Le CPVP a recommandé que le CIPC établisse un échéancier clair concernant l'établissement de PE comprenant des dispositions sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les modalités d'utilisation, avec tous les services de police.Note de bas de page 2 La GRC a répondu que le CIPC négociait activement avec les derniers services de police (25 %) qui n'avaient pas encore signé de PE et que tous les PE seraient signés au 31 mars 2012.
Au moment du suivi, tous les utilisateurs et organismes externes, sauf un service de police, avaient signé un PE conformément aux politiques et procédures établies. En ce qui a trait au PE qui n'avait pas été signé, les personnes interviewées ont indiqué que le service de police maintient que la législation provinciale l'empêche de signer un PE avec une entité fédérale. Le CIPC poursuit les discussions avec les cadres supérieurs en vue de conclure le PE. En attendant que le PE soit signé, le CIPC continue de partager la version actuelle de l'entente avec le service de police en cause afin de respecter son obligation de communiquer les attentes de la GRC, les modalités d'utilisation et les dispositions de protection des renseignements personnels.
Les PE conclus avec les utilisateurs externes sont renouvelés aux quatre ans, ce qui permet au CIPC de confirmer périodiquement si l'organisme a toujours besoin d'accéder au système et de faire des mises à jour en cas de modification des politiques ou des procédures. Nous avons examiné les modèles de PE utilisés par le CIPC pour confirmer qu'ils communiquent efficacement les attentes de la GRC relatives au traitement de renseignements personnels. Nous avons aussi vérifié que les PE sont renouvelés de façon continue.
En ce qui a trait aux utilisateurs internes de la GRC, la vérification visait à déterminer si les employés recevaient une formation appropriée relative à leurs responsabilités quant aux politiques et aux procédures régissant le CIPC et, plus précisément, les dispositions de protection des renseignements personnels. La GRC a élaboré deux cours obligatoires, qui sont offerts régulièrement : le Cours sur les fonctions de consultation et de transmission de messages narratifs (pour les utilisateurs qui ont accès au système en mode lecture seule) et le Cours de mise à jour du CIPC (pour les utilisateurs qui contribuent directement à la mise à jour et à la tenue de renseignements et de dossiers). Le Cours sur les fonctions de consultation et de transmission de messages narratifs est offert en ligne aux organismes du CIPC par l'entremise du Réseau canadien du savoir policier (RCSP) et aux utilisateurs de la GRC par l'intermédiaire du système de gestion de l'apprentissage AGORA. En 2012, un total de 940 personnes ont suivi le cours; en 2013, il y a eu 651 inscriptions. Selon les rapports annuels du CIPC, le Cours de mise à jour du CIPC est offert aux utilisateurs internes et externes; en 2012 et en 2013, un total de 202 et de 343 utilisateurs respectivement ont suivi le cours.
Notre examen a confirmé que le CIPC a établi des processus pour bien communiquer aux utilisateurs les attentes relatives à la protection des renseignements personnels. Le CIPC a donné suite de façon satisfaisante à la recommandation du CPVP visant l'établissement avec tous les services de PE contenant des dispositions sur la protection de renseignements personnels et les attentes à leur égard.
3.2 Système d'incidents et de rapports de police
Examen des droits d'accès et de la conformité à la politique
Il existe des possibilités d'améliorer les pratiques de la GRC relatives à l'examen des droits d'accès et de la conformité à la politique du SIRP régissant l'utilisation de renseignements personnels.
Lors de sa vérification de 2011, le CPVP a examiné les contrôles d'accès pour déterminer si les renseignements personnels contenus dans le SIRP étaient bien protégés contre les atteintes à la vie privée. Le CPVP a constaté que les droits d'accès n'étaient pas toujours mis à jour ou révoqués en temps opportun lorsque les utilisateurs changent d'emploi.Note de bas de page 3 Le CPVP a indiqué que malgré la politique de la GRC exigeant la révocation du droit d'accès d'un utilisateur s'il n'est plus nécessaire ou après quatorze mois d'inactivité, il y avait au moment de la vérification plus de 1 000 utilisateurs dont les comptes actifs n'avaient pas servi depuis quatorze mois ou plus.Note de bas de page 4
Le CPVP a recommandé que la GRC examine régulièrement l'état des comptes d'utilisateur du SIRP et qu'elle retire l'accès s'il n'est plus nécessaire. La GRC a répondu qu'elle prendrait immédiatement des mesures pour corriger la situation et qu'elle examinerait ses pratiques actuelles de formation des employés chargés d'examiner les comptes d'utilisateur du SIRP.
Au moment du suivi, les demandes d'accès au SIRP et au SIRPP provenant de la GRC et d'organismes partenaires étaient acheminées au CSSPO par l'entremise des coordonnateurs divisionnaires de la gestion des dossiers. Après avoir confirmé que les approbations voulues ont été obtenues et que l'utilisateur possède les certifications nécessaires, le CSSPO recommande au groupe de l'infrastructure à clés publiques (ICP), du Secteur du DPI, d'attribuer le droit d'accès. S'il s'agit d'un organisme partenaire, le CSSPO doit vérifier qu'un PE figure dans la documentation fournie par le coordonnateur. De plus, le groupe de la conformité législative externe au sein du CSSPO examine les lois et les ententes applicables à l'organisme en cause en cas de conflit éventuel.
Nous avons constaté que les contrôles liés à l'attribution de droits d'accès sont solides et que le CSSPO examine régulièrement les comptes inactifs, conformément à la politique du SIRP. Le CSSPO utilise les rapports pour dresser régulièrement la liste d'utilisateurs dont les comptes sont inactifs et recommande la suppression des comptes, au besoin.
Nous avons constaté qu'un processus semblable existe pour la suppression de comptes d'utilisateur du SIRPP qui sont inactifs.
Le fait de mener des examens plus fréquents et de supprimer les comptes inactifs donne suite à la recommandation du CPVP, mais le risque qu'un utilisateur sans besoin légitime de consulter certains dossiers opérationnels puisse continuer de ce faire persiste. Si un employé continue d'utiliser son compte pour consulter sans autorisation des dossiers, le compte demeure actif et n'est donc pas supprimé. Il faut donc des processus rigoureux pour confirmer le départ d'un employé et revalider régulièrement les besoins en matière d'accès pour assurer la conformité.
En examinant régulièrement l'état des comptes et en supprimant les comptes inactifs, la GRC a effectivement donné suite à la constatation du CPVP que le fait de laisser les droits d'accès aux utilisateurs qui ne sont plus autorisés à consulter le SIRP augmente le risque de consultations non autorisées.Note de bas de page 5 Cependant, il existe d'autres possibilités de limiter l'accès au SIRP et au SIRPP aux personnes dont l'accès est nécessaire pour effectuer les tâches professionnelles.
Outre l'examen des contrôles d'accès, le CPVP a examiné les capacités de journalisation des transactions dans le SIRP permettant à la GRC de relever les abus éventuels. Le CPVP a constaté que le SIRP permet de faire le suivi des opérations des utilisateurs dans les journaux de transactions, y compris les documents examinés et les modifications apportées. Cependant, la GRC ne surveille pas activement les opérations des utilisateurs puisqu'elle n'a pas recours à une méthode efficace permettant de réunir et d'examiner les entrées des journaux. Le CPVP a recommandé que la GRC active l'outil d'examen des journaux de transactions. La GRC a accepté la recommandation du CPVP et s'est engagée à activer l'outil de d'examen des journaux de transactions.
Nous avons constaté que l'outil d'examen des journaux de transactions a été activé et que les officiers responsables des Enquêtes criminelles (OREC) dans les divisions s'en servent pour examiner les abus éventuels par les utilisateurs internes et externes. Nous avons aussi constaté que le protocole régissant l'utilisation de l'outil a évolué. Par le passé, il fallait obtenir l'approbation de l'agent de la sécurité ministérielle, mais on a depuis donné plus de pouvoirs et de latitude aux OREC pour autoriser l'utilisation de l'outil. Depuis la mise en œuvre de l'outil, le CSSPO a indiqué qu'il reçoit régulièrement quelques demandes par semaine.
La Sous-direction du développement des applications, au sein du Secteur du DPI, a indiqué qu'une fonction semblable permettant l'examen des journaux de transactions n'a pas été activée dans le SIRPP. La GRC ne dispose donc pas d'une méthode efficace de relever et d'évaluer les abus éventuels. Les quelque 2 500 utilisateurs du SIRPP ont un accès illimité à tous les dossiers qui s'y trouvent. Il y a un nombre plus restreint d'utilisateurs, mais l'incidence éventuelle d'une atteinte à la sécurité est beaucoup plus sérieuse, étant donné la nature des renseignements que contient la base de données.
La vérification effectuée par le CPVP visait aussi à déterminer si la GRC a pris des mesures pour veiller à ce que les 23 services de police partenaires gèrent les renseignements personnels contenus dans le SIRP conformément aux politiques et aux procédures applicables. Le CPVP a constaté que la GRC a signé des PE avec les services de police partenaires, lesquels énoncent les modalités d'utilisation, y compris des dispositions sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Il a confirmé que les PE comprennent des clauses permettant à la GRC d'examiner l'utilisation du système par les services partenaires; cependant, la GRC n'a entrepris qu'un nombre limité d'examens. Le CPVP a recommandé que la GRC adopte un processus d'examen régulier pour confirmer que tous les utilisateurs, y compris les services partenaires, respectent les politiques et les procédures régissant l'utilisation du système. De tels examens permettraient de confirmer l'utilisation et la diffusion acceptable des renseignements contenus dans le SIRP et viseraient les clauses sur la sécurité, les exigences en matière de formation, les procédures de signalement d'incidents et les protocoles établis pour s'assurer que les renseignements contenus dans le SIRP servent uniquement à des fins légitimes d'application de la loi.
Dans sa réponse initiale à la vérification du CPVP, la GRC a indiqué que dans le cadre de son plan de refonte de la gestion de l'information, elle s'assurera que les utilisateurs du SIRP, tant à l'interne qu'à l'externe, fassent l'objet d'examens réguliers. Faute de ressources, la Sous-direction de la gestion de l'information a communiqué une nouvelle stratégie en septembre 2014, expliquant que plutôt d'établir un processus d'examen officiel, elle renforcerait les initiatives de formation et de sensibilisation pour assurer le respect des politiques et procédures par les utilisateurs.
Lors du suivi, les représentants du DPI ont indiqué que trois projets sont en cours visant la formation et la sensibilisation en matière de protection des renseignements personnels. Il s'agit entre autres de produire et de distribuer des ressources vidéo, d'élaborer du matériel de formation et d'envoyer aux employés un questionnaire pour évaluer leur niveau de connaissances. En février 2016, ces projets n'avaient pas été terminés, mais on prévoit les terminer en 2016.
Les initiatives actuelles du DPI visant le respect des politiques et procédures se limitent à augmenter les connaissances et la sensibilisation des utilisateurs internes par l'entremise d'outils de formation et de communication. Cependant, la constatation et la recommandation du CPVP visaient précisément la surveillance et la conformité via l'adoption d'un processus d'examen officiel permettant d'assurer le respect des politiques et procédures par les utilisateurs internes et externes.
En l'absence d'un processus d'examen rigoureux, la GRC ne peut garantir que les utilisateurs respectent les conditions d'utilisation et les dispositions de protection des renseignements personnels contenus dans le SIRP. Cela crée un risque organisationnel pour la GRC, en tant que responsable du système et des renseignements versés dans le SIRP.
La GRC a fait des progrès en matière de surveillance et de suppression des comptes inactifs, mais il existe d'autres possibilités de prévenir le risque d'accès non autorisé ou non légitime. La GRC a activé l'outil d'examen des journaux de transactions afin d'analyser régulièrement les opérations des utilisateurs dans le SIRP; il faudrait créer une fonction semblable dans le SIRPP. Enfin, la GRC devrait songer à intégrer une fonction d'examen à son processus de surveillance et de respect des politiques du SIRP.
Gestion des suspensions du casier
Il existe des possibilités d'améliorer les pratiques de la GRC relatives au traitement des dossiers ayant fait l'objet d'une suspension du casier judiciaire (réhabilitation) dans les fichiers et dossiers physiques.
Lors de sa vérification de 2011, le CPVP a examiné si la GRC respectait les périodes de conservation prescrites par les lois fédérales dans sa gestion des renseignements personnels contenus dans le SIRP. Le CPVP a constaté que la GRC avait élaboré des politiques et des procédures, en vertu des lois en vigueur, précisant pendant combien de temps peuvent être conservés les renseignements et quand ils doivent être retirés. Cependant, le CPVP a constaté que les politiques n'étaient pas respectés et la GRC ne supprimait pas les dossiers du SIRP, tel que requis. Les renseignements qui auraient donc dû être éliminés au terme de la période de conservation prévue (selon la date de la sentence la plus longue imposée par suite de l'enquête) demeuraient accessibles dans la base de données. Le CPVP a recommandé que la GRC élimine les données du SIRP qui doivent l'être selon les périodes de conservation établies de façon à respecter la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. La GRC était d'accord et s'est engagée à prendre des mesures immédiates.
La GRC a donné suite à la recommandation en 2012, éliminant la majorité des dossiers visés avant la fin de l'année. En 2013, un problème technique lors d'une mise à jour du système a causé un arriéré de plus d'un million de dossiers; cependant, nous avons confirmé que la Sous-direction du développement des applications a réglé le problème et que l'arriéré a été éliminé. Nous avons aussi constaté que la Sous-direction du développement des applications a pris des mesures pour éviter que les mises à jour ultérieures ne perturbent le processus d'élimination.
La vérification du CPVP a effectivement donné lieu à des changements au niveau de la suppression des dossiers du SIRP, mais notre examen a révélé que malgré des périodes de conservation semblables, les dossiers du SIRPP ne sont pas éliminés en temps opportun. Le SIRPP utilise la même plateforme que le SIRP et offre donc les mêmes fonctions de base; cependant, nous avons constaté que la fonction d'élimination dans le SIRPP n'a pas été activée. La GRC risque donc de ne pas respecter les dispositions de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.
Dans le cadre de son examen des procédures de suppression, le CPVP a constaté que la GRC n'avait établi aucun processus pour éliminer du SIRP les dossiers ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation et les dossiers liés à des condamnations injustifiées. Le CPVP a fait remarquer que la non-suppression en temps voulu de ces renseignements risque de nuire à la vie privée des personnes en cause et de limiter leurs possibilités d'emploi, de voyage et de bénévolat.
La réhabilitation, ou la suspension du casier, permet que soient gardés à part les casiers judiciaires des personnes qui ont été déclarées coupables d'une infraction criminelle, mais qui ont fini de purger leur peine et ont démontré qu'elles sont maintenant des citoyens respectueux de la loi.Note de bas de page 6 On utilise aussi le terme « isolement ».
Le CPVP a recommandé que la GRC instaure des processus pour supprimer l'accès aux dossiers liés aux infractions ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation et aux condamnations injustifiées qui se trouvent dans la base de données du SIRP. La GRC a accepté de prendre les mesures nécessaires.
Nous voulions donc confirmer que la GRC isole les renseignements liés aux personnes réhabilitées et aux condamnations injustifiées dans le SIRP et qu'elle limite l'accès à de tels renseignements dans les fichiers et dossiers papier.
Nous avons constaté que la Sous-direction de la gestion de l'information a élaboré des procédures détaillées sur le traitement des dossiers ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation dans le SIRP. La Commission des libérations conditionnelles du Canada avise la GRC des suspensions de casiers judiciaires et des condamnations injustifiées par l'entremise des Services canadiens d'identification criminelle en temps réel (SCICTR). Les SCICTR isolent alors les dossiers visés dans le système du CIPC et en informent les divisions et les services de police partenaires qui ont contribué des renseignements aux dossiers isolés. Il incombe à ces organisations, à leur tour, d'isoler les renseignements et les dossiers pertinents dans les autres bases de données (le SIRP et le SIRPP). Selon les personnes interviewées, les SCICTR n'informent pas toujours promptement les divisions des suspensions de casiers judiciaires. Les divisions reçoivent habituellement une série d'avis à la fois, parfois avec plusieurs mois de retard.
À la réception d'avis des SCICTR, les coordonnateurs divisionnaires de la gestion de l'information consultent le SIRP et mettent les dossiers visés dans une zone protégée du système. Après la vérification du CPVP, la GRC a créé des profils d'accès spéciaux permettant uniquement aux utilisateurs identifiés de consulter les renseignements et les dossiers ainsi isolés. De manière générale, selon nos essais et nos discussions avec la direction, nous avons constaté que la GRC a donné suite à la recommandation du CPVP visant l'isolement des renseignements dans le SIRP. Le CPVP n'a pas examiné les procédures établies pour l'isolement de renseignements dans les dossiers physiques, mais nous nous y sommes penchés dans le cadre de notre suivi. Dans les quatre divisions que nous avons visitées, nous avons observé une variété de pratiques, dont certaines sont beaucoup plus efficaces que d'autres.
Des fichiers et dossiers opérationnels physiques peuvent être conservés au quartier général, dans les bureaux divisionnaires de la GI et dans les détachements – mais dans la plupart des cas, ils sont gardés dans les détachements. Les bureaux divisionnaires de la GI examinent et isolent les dossiers conservés par la division pour leurs clients, dont les groupes fédéraux (délits commerciaux, gestion des cas graves, sécurité frontalière). Les bureaux divisionnaires de la GI tentent toujours de traiter les suspensions de casiers dès leur réception, mais en raison des nombreuses tâches administratives à effectuer et du manque de ressources, les bureaux ont élaboré diverses stratégies d'atténuation des risques. Ils ont recours à des pratiques différentes, mais le but est toujours le même : veiller à ce que les renseignements isolés soient gardés à part des autres renseignements, conformément à la Loi sur le casier judiciaire. Certains bureaux divisionnaires de la GI procèdent à des examens minutieux pour déterminer les renseignements à isoler, tandis que d'autres se contentent d'un examen superficiel ou ne consultent même pas le dossier. Dans une division, où il n'existe aucun processus d'examen détaillé, des dossiers complets contenant des renseignements avec des liens éventuels à des infractions ayant fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation sont marqués et classés à part. Ces dossiers ne sont examinés en détail pour supprimer les renseignements isolés que si une personne de l'extérieur du bureau divisionnaire de la GI demande de les consulter. Cette pratique satisfait à l'exigence prévue par la Loi sur le casier judiciaire, et selon la nature du dossier et les ressources disponibles, il peut s'agir d'une pratique exemplaire à l'appui de l'administration efficace de ce processus.
En ce qui a trait aux détachements, il n'y a aucune surveillance ou contrôle à l'échelle divisionnaire ou nationale pour garantir qu'ils prennent les mesures nécessaires pour isoler les renseignements liés à des dossiers faisant l'objet de suspensions de casiers. Les gestionnaires divisionnaires se préoccupent de la capacité des détachements à bien gérer le processus, étant donné les autres fonctions essentielles qui leur incombent. Puisque la majorité des dossiers sont conservés dans les détachements, la situation présente des risques importants.
La GRC a donné suite à la recommandation visant l'isolement de renseignements liés aux personnes réhabilitées et aux condamnations injustifiées qui se trouvent dans le SIRP, mais il existe des possibilités d'accélérer le processus et d'améliorer l'efficacité et l'exhaustivité des méthodes utilisées pour isoler des renseignements dans les fichiers et dossiers physiques.
4. Recommandations
Le sous-commissaire aux Services de police contractuels et autochtones évalue et améliore, le cas échéant, les pratiques établies pour surveiller les droits d'accès au SIRP et les risques liés aux consultations non autorisées.
Le sous-commissaire aux Services de police contractuels et autochtones, en collaboration avec le sous-commissaire aux Services de police spécialisés et le dirigeant principal de l'Information, adopte un processus d'examen régulier pour assurer le respect des politiques et procédures régissant l'utilisation du SIRP.
Le sous-commissaire aux Services de police spécialisés, en collaboration avec le dirigeant principal de l'Information et le sous-commissaire aux Services de police contractuels et autochtones, assure l'élimination voulue des dossiers du SIRPP aux fins de conformité avec les dispositions de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Il faudrait aussi prendre en considération l'amélioration de la capacité de surveillance des opérations des utilisateurs du SIRPP en activant un outil d'examen des journaux de transactions.
Le sous-commissaire aux Services de police spécialisés, en collaboration avec le dirigeant principal de l'Information, évalue les procédures existantes liées aux dossiers ayant fait l'objet d'une suspension du casier (réhabilitation), en ce qui a trait au caviardage des dossiers physiques, pour s'assurer que les divisions utilisent une méthode efficace qui satisfait aux exigences prévues par les lois fédérales.
5. Conclusion
En général, la GRC a effectivement donné suite à la majorité des constatations et des recommandations du CPVP. Cependant, il existe des possibilités de renforcer la sécurité des renseignements personnels contenus dans les bases de données opérationnelles de la GRC en améliorant les activités de surveillance et de contrôle de la conformité du SIRP.
La GRC devrait également assurer l'élimination des dossiers du SIRPP en temps voulu, conformément à la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Il faudrait aussi prendre en considération l'amélioration de la capacité de surveillance des opérations des utilisateurs du SIRPP en activant un outil d'examen des journaux de transactions.
Enfin, en ce qui a trait à la gestion de renseignements et de dossiers physiques liés aux personnes réhabilitées et aux condamnations injustifiées, la GRC devrait songer à améliorer les procédures existantes afin d'établir une méthode uniforme et simplifiée qui satisfait aux exigences prévues par les lois fédérales pertinentes.
Annexe A – Objectif et critères de vérification
Objectif : Déterminer si les processus mis en place pour protéger, conserver et supprimer les renseignements personnels assurent le respect des délais prescrits, s'ils sont efficaces et s'ils sont conformes aux politiques établies.
Critère 1 : La GRC a établi et mis en œuvre des procédures régissant les droits d'accès et l'utilisation des renseignements personnels.
Critère 2 : La GRC a établi et mis en œuvre des procédures, en fonction des politiques existantes, pour retirer les renseignements personnels ou les rendre inaccessibles.
Critère 3 : Les mesures nécessaires sont prises pour satisfaire aux exigences techniques visant à assurer la sécurité des renseignements personnels.
Notes de bas de page
Follow-up to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s Audit of the Security of Personal Information
Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services
CIO
Chief Information Officer
CPIC
Canadian Police Information Centre
DSB
Departmental Security Branch
MAP
Management Action Plan
MOU
Memorandums of Understanding
OPC
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
OSSC
Operational Systems Service Centre
PROS
Police Reporting and Occurrence System
RBAP
Risk-Based Audit Plan
RCMP
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SPROS
Secure Police Reporting and Occurrence System
Executive summary
As Canada's national police force, the RCMP holds a vast array of personal information within its operational, administrative, and employee databases and within physical files. In executing its mandate, the RCMP has a legislative obligation to properly safeguard, maintain and in some cases, destroy this information. In 2011, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) conducted an audit that examined the policies, systems, administrative controls and safeguards implemented by the RCMP for the safeguarding of personal information within the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) and Police Reporting and Occurrence System (PROS) systems. The results of that audit indicated that the management of personal information held in operational databases needed improvement. The OPC audit contained six recommendations, five of which pertained to PROS, the RCMP's primary occurrence reporting system. With respect to PROS, the audit found that: personal information was being retained longer than required; the ability to review and investigate user actions was limited; there was insufficient monitoring of PROS user accounts; there was no review process to ensure users were complying with policies and procedures; and there was no process to remove access to records related to pardoned offences (now known as records suspensions). A sixth recommendation related to a lack of formal agreements for external agencies accessing the CPIC system.
In April 2014, the Commissioner approved an assurance engagement of the Security of Personal Information as part of the 2014-17 Risk-Based Audit Plan (RBAP). The engagement objective included a follow-up to assess the progress made in addressing the recommendations included in the 2011 Office of the Privacy Commissioner report, as well as an examination of similar controls relating to the Secure Police Reporting Occurrence System (SPROS).
The current audit found that the RCMP had effectively addressed the majority of the OPC's findings and recommendations. However, opportunities exist to further enhance the security of personal information maintained within RCMP operational databases by enhancing monitoring and compliance activities associated with the PROS and SPROS databases. Additionally, the RCMP should assess existing record suspension (pardon) procedures, with respect to the vetting of physical records, to ensure divisions are following an efficient approach that meets the requirements of relevant Federal Acts.
The management response included in this report demonstrates the commitment from senior management to address the audit findings and recommendations. A detailed management action plan is to be developed. Once approved, RCMP Internal Audit will monitor its implementation.
Management's response to the audit
Contract and Aboriginal Policing
Contract and Aboriginal Policing agrees with the findings and recommendations in the follow-up to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner's Audit of the Security of Personal Information. Work has begun to assess existing practices in place to monitor user access to PROS, as well as users' compliance to the terms and conditions governing the use of PROS and an action plan will be developed to further enhance appropriate measures that minimize and mitigate risks relating to inappropriate access and non-compliance. This may include examining automated and/or manual processes which could be implemented at the National or Divisional level. A detailed action plan will be available by June 2016 and will contain specific timelines and milestones to which the RCMP will adhere.
Contract and Aboriginal Policing agrees with the recommendation that records be appropriately purged from SPROS to be in compliance with the Privacy Act. This recommendation requires collaboration with the Deputy Commissioner, Special Policing Services, the Chief Information Officer and the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing who assumed responsibility for SPROS policy and compliance in 2016. A meeting will be convened by April 2016 to ensure that all the participants are aware of the role that is required of them in order to develop a management action plan and to establish a transaction log review tool similar to that in PROS.
Byron Boucher, Acting D/Commr. Contract and Aboriginal Policing
Special Policing Services
Overall, SPS agrees with the findings and recommendations in the follow-up to the Office of the Privacy Commissioners Audit of the Security of Personal Information. Work has begun to assist Contract Aboriginal Policing in assessing the technical requirements relating to the establishment of a review process to ensure users' compliance to the terms and conditions governing the use of PROS. In addition, SPS will work directly with officials in Federal Policing to ensure the same disposition features available in PROS are activated and maintained in SPROS. Finally, SPS has begun to assess opportunities for improvement within the current vetting of physical records process. Overall, SPS has initiated the assessment of the requirements, associated costs and other related challenges in the development of a detailed management action plan.
Peter Henschel, D/Commr. Special Policing Services
1. Background
As Canada's national police force, the RCMP holds a vast array of personal information within its operational, administrative, and employee databases and within physical files. In executing its mandate, the RCMP has a legislative obligation to properly safeguard, maintain and in some cases, destroy this information.
Personal information includes factual or subjective information about an identifiable individual. This information can be in digital form within information management systems or databases, or in physical form within records or files. Within the RCMP, a significant amount of personal information collected through policing activities is housed in digital form in the following operational systems: the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) system; the Police Reporting and Occurrence System (PROS); and the Secure Police Reporting Occurrence System (SPROS). CPIC is operated by the RCMP on behalf of the Canadian law enforcement community. CPIC provides information about crimes and the individuals who committed crimes. It is the only national information-sharing system that links criminal justice and law enforcement partners across Canada and internationally. PROS is the primary occurrence reporting and records management system used by the RCMP in all provinces except British ColumbiaFootnote 1. It is used to record all aspects of an incident involving police, from the moment an occurrence is reported to final disposition if the investigation proceeds to a court process. PROS contains information on individuals who have come into contact with police, either as suspects, victims, or witnesses. SPROS is the primary database for the electronic storage, retrieval and management of information relating to national security criminal investigations. It is also used, on an as required basis, to store classified criminal intelligence and other information relating to sensitive cases.
Protecting personal information within the RCMP is a collective responsibility that is actively carried out by several units. At the time of our audit, the Operational Systems Service Centre (OSSC), reporting to Contract and Aboriginal Policing (CAP), was responsible for both policy and the management of users' access associated with PROS and SPROS. Under the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Sector, the Information Management Branch (IMB) provides advice and guidance on the disposition of records and the identification of records of archival value. Finally, the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), within Specialized Policing Services (SPS) is responsible for the management of the CPIC system.
In 2011, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) conducted an audit that examined the policies, systems, administrative controls and safeguards implemented by the RCMP for the safeguarding of personal information within the CPIC and PROS systems. The results of that audit indicated that the management of personal information held in operational databases needed improvement. Specifically, the audit reported that memorandums of understanding (MOUs) communicating conditions of use and privacy provisions were not in place with all external users of the CPIC system. In the case of PROS: personal information was being held longer than required; users' access was not being adequately monitored; there was limited ability to review a user's actions; and there was no review or oversight process to provide assurance that users were complying with the policies and procedures governing the use of personal information.
In April 2014, the Commissioner approved an assurance engagement of the Security of Personal Information as part of the 2014-17 Risk-Based Audit Plan (RBAP). The engagement objective included a follow-up to assess the progress made in addressing the recommendations included in the 2011 Office of the Privacy Commissioner report, as well as an examination of similar controls relating to the SPROS system.
2. Objectives, scope and methodology
2.1 Objective
The objective of the audit was to determine whether processes in place to safeguard, maintain and destroy personal information held for operational purposes are timely, effective and meet policy requirements.
2.2 Scope
The main focus of the audit was to follow-up on the actions taken in response to the 2011 audit conducted by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). While the OPC audit focused on personal information held within CPIC and PROS, this engagement also included review of controls in place to safeguard personal information within the RCMP's Secure Police Occurrence Reporting System (SPROS).
The audit was conducted in consideration of section 6 of the Privacy Act which defines personal information and the legislative requirements for securing it. The audit considered personal information stored for operational purposes in both digital and paper formats. The audit did not assess the accuracy or completeness of the personal information held by the RCMP and the impact this information may have had on management's decision making.
2.3 Methodology
Planning for the audit was completed in July 2015. In this phase, the audit team conducted interviews, process walkthroughs and examined relevant policies, directives, procedures and results of previous audit work performed.
Sources used to develop audit criteria and detailed audit tests included prior audit findings and requirements for handling of personal information as defined within the Privacy Act, Criminal Records Act and RCMP policies. The audit objective and criteria are available in Appendix A.
The examination phase, which concluded in November 2015, employed various auditing techniques including interviews, documentation reviews and physical observation. Upon completion of the examination phase, the audit team held meetings to validate findings with personnel and debriefed senior management of the relevant findings.
2.4 Statement of conformance
The audit engagement conforms with the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada, as supported by the results of the quality assurance and improvement program
3. Audit findings
The 2011 Office of the Privacy Commissioner's (OPC) Audit of Selected RCMP Databases found that the management of personal information held in operational databases needed improvement. The OPC audit contained six recommendations, five of which pertained to PROS, the RCMP's primary occurrence reporting system. With respect to PROS, the audit found that: personal information was being retained longer than required; the ability to review and investigate user actions was limited; there was insufficient monitoring of PROS user accounts; there was no review process to ensure users were complying with policies and procedures; and there was no process to remove access to records related to pardoned offences (now known as records suspensions). A sixth recommendation related to a lack of formal agreements for external agencies accessing the CPIC system.
Management accepted the audit findings and recommendations and committed to taking immediate action to rectify all issues identified in the OPC audit. Accordingly, we expected to find that improvements had been made that strengthened the stewardship practices in place to protect personal information. Specifically, we expected that:
Formal agreements would be in place with all entities accessing the CPIC system;
Regular monitoring of user access and activity would be taking place on RCMP operational databases;
Internal and external users of PROS would be subject to regular review to ensure compliance with policies and procedures;
Information in PROS would be removed (purged) or sequestered in accordance with governing legislation.
Overall, we found that the RCMP had addressed five of the six recommendations from the OPC's 2011 audit. The recommendation to implement a review process to provide assurances that all users are complying with the policies and procedures governing the use of the personal information in PROS had not been put into place. In addition, over and above the recommendations stemming from the OPC audit, we found further opportunities exist to: improve the monitoring of PROS user accounts; extend the enhancements applied to PROS to other operational databases; and develop a more efficient and effective strategy for sequestering personal information in physical files.
3.1 CPI Centre
The CPI Centre has established tools to effectively communicate privacy provisions and expectations to all users.
In its 2011 audit of select RCMP operational data bases, the OPC found that the RCMP had developed and implemented policies and procedures to protect the personal information of Canadians being stored and retrieved from the CPIC system. Given that CPIC is accessed by external partners and other law enforcement agencies, the RCMP had established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to communicate conditions of use, including privacy provisions, to all external users. The OPC audit found that the RCMP did not have agreements in place with 25% of police agencies that were accessing CPIC. The OPC recommended that the RCMP set a clear timeframe for the establishment of MOUs with all external entities to ensure terms of use and privacy provisions were effectively communicated.Footnote 2 The RCMP responded that it was actively in negotiations with the remaining 25% of agencies and expected that all MOUs would be in place by March 31, 2012.
With the exception of one police force, at the time of this follow-up engagement, agreements were in place with all external agencies and users in accordance with its established policies and procedures. Regarding the one outstanding MOU, interviewees reported that the police force has maintained a position that its provincial legislation precludes it from signing an MOU with a federal entity. CPI Centre has continued to hold discussions at the senior and executive management level in an effort to obtain a signed MOU. Additionally, while the MOU remains unsigned, CPI Centre has continued to share the current version of the MOU with that police force in an effort to meet its obligation to communicate RCMP expectations, conditions of use and privacy provisions.
The MOUs serving external users are renewed on a four-year cycle, which allows CPI Centre to periodically validate whether an agency has a continued need for access to the system as well as the opportunity to update the MOU to address any changes in policy and procedures. We reviewed the MOU templates used by CPI Centre to confirm that they appropriately address the RCMP expectations regarding the treatment of personal information. We also validated that the MOUs are being renewed on an ongoing basis.
For internal RCMP users, the audit examined whether training was provided to employees to ensure they are informed of their responsibilities with respect to policies and procedures governing CPIC and specifically its privacy provisions. The RCMP has developed and regularly offers two mandatory courses, the Query and Narrative course (QN) for users with read-only access and the CPIC Maintenance course for users who update and maintain CPIC records and information. The Query and Narrative course is available online to all CPIC agencies through the Canadian Police Knowledge Network and in the AGORA learning and development system for RCMP users. In 2012, 940 individuals completed the course, while 651 completed it in 2013. Information obtained from CPIC annual reports identified that the CPIC Maintenance course is provided to both internal and external users and that in 2012 and 2013 respectively, 202 and 343 users completed the course.
Our examination determined that the CPI Centre has processes in place to ensure expectations regarding privacy are communicated to all users and that the OPC recommendation to establish MOUs that communicate privacy provisions and expectations with all entities has been satisfactorily addressed.
3.2 Police Reporting and Occurrence System
Monitoring access and compliance with policy
Opportunities exist to enhance the RCMP's practices for monitoring access, and ensuring compliance to PROS policy regarding the use of personal information.
The 2011 OPC audit examined access controls to ensure the personal information contained within PROS was adequately protected from breaches to privacy. The OPC found that access rights were not always updated or disabled in a timely fashion as users moved between jobsFootnote 3. They noted that while RCMP policy requires that a user's access be revoked when no longer required or after 14 months of inactivity, at the time of their audit there were in excess of 1000 user accounts that had not been accessed in 14 months or longerFootnote 4.
The OPC recommended that the RCMP undertake regular reviews on the status of PROS user accounts and disable access when it is no longer required. The RCMP responded that it would immediately address the monitoring of users' access and would also examine its current training practices for employees who carry out the review of PROS user accounts.
At the time of our audit, requests for access to PROS and SPROS, by both RCMP and partner agencies, were being submitted to OSSC via the divisional records management coordinators. OSSC verifies that the required approvals have been obtained, and ensures that the users have obtained the required certifications prior to recommending that the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) unit within the Chief Information Officer sector grants access. OSSC also ensures that when a partner agency is involved, an MOU is included with the documentation received from the coordinator. Additionally, the external legislative conformity unit within OSSC reviews the agency's applicable acts and agreements for any concerns that might need to be addressed.
We found that the controls associated with granting access are robust and that OSSC is regularly monitoring inactive PROS accounts, in accordance with the PROS policy. OSSC utilizes reports to identify inactive users on a regular basis and recommends their de-activation when required.
We found that a similar process was in place for de-activating SPROS user accounts which had no recorded activity.
While increased monitoring and removal of dormant accounts addresses the OPC recommendation, the risk remains that users who no longer have a requirement to access specific operational records may continue to do so. If an individual continues to use their account to inappropriately access records, it will never appear dormant and be removed. It is only through robust out-clearance processes, and processes to periodically reconfirm access requirements, that strict compliance can be assured.
While the OPC observation that user accounts that remain active beyond their requirement increase the risk of unauthorized accessFootnote 5 has been partially addressed through increased monitoring and removal of dormant accounts, there are additional opportunities to ensure only users with a continued requirement have access to the PROS and SPROS systems.
In addition to monitoring access controls, the OPC also examined the transaction logging capabilities which would allow the RCMP to assess PROS user activity in the case of incidents of potential misuse. The OPC found that transaction logs within PROS tracked individual user's activities, including the records viewed and modifications made. However, user activity was not being actively monitored, as the process to do so was not efficient, given that a tool had not been implemented to enable quick extraction and analysis of the transaction log data. Accordingly, the OPC recommended that the RCMP enable the audit (transaction) log review tool. The RCMP accepted the OPC's recommendation and committed to enabling the transaction log review tool.
We found that the transaction log review tool had been implemented and is currently being used by Divisional Criminal Operations Officers (CROPS) to review potential incidents of misuse by internal and external users. We also noted that the protocol for using the tool had evolved. Originally, use of the review tool required the approval of the Departmental Security Officer, however more authority and discretion has subsequently been given to CROPS to direct the use of the tool. Since its implementation, OSSC reported that they have been steadily receiving a few requests per week.
The Application Development Branch, within the CIO sector, reported that a similar transaction review log function has not been implemented within SPROS. As a result the RCMP does not have an efficient tool to detect and assess potential misuse of this system. SPROS has a user base of approximately 2500 users. SPROS users have unrestricted access to any file in the system. While there are fewer users, given the nature of the information contained in this database, the impact of a breach could be much greater.
The OPC also examined whether the RCMP had measures in place to ensure the 23 police partner agencies manage the personal information within PROS in accordance with applicable policy and procedures. The OPC found that MOUs were in place between the RCMP and the police partner agencies that communicate conditions of use including privacy provisions. It noted that the MOUs include provisions for the RCMP to conduct reviews of partner agencies' use of the system; however, it found that only a limited number of such reviews had been undertaken by the RCMP. Accordingly, it recommended that the RCMP adopt a consistent and regular review process to ensure that all users, including partner agencies, are complying with terms and conditions of use. Such review would assist in ensuring acceptable use and sharing of the information contained in PROS, and would examine security provisions, training requirements, breach-reporting procedures and the protocols in place to ensure the information contained in PROS is used only for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
Originally, the RCMP's response to the OPC audit indicated that as part of its Information Management Renewal Plan it would ensure that both internal and external users of PROS would be subject to a periodic review process. Due to resourcing constraints, the Information Management Branch communicated a new strategy in September 2014, advising that in place of a formal review process, training and awareness initiatives would be enhanced to address the area of user compliance.
During the current audit, CIO representatives reported that three projects were underway that would provide training and awareness with respect to the protection of information. This work included producing and distributing video material, developing training material and releasing a questionnaire to gauge the level of awareness of employees, among other actions. As of February 2016, these projects had not been completed although completion is expected in 2016.
The CIO's current initiatives to address user compliance are limited to improving internal users' knowledge and awareness through training and communication tools; however, the original OPC finding and recommendation spoke of monitoring and compliance through a formal review process that would assess compliance of all users, both internal and external.
Without a robust monitoring regime, the RCMP does not have assurance that all users are complying with the terms, conditions, and privacy provisions that govern the use of personal information within PROS. This creates an organization risk to the RCMP as the system owner and custodian of the information within PROS.
While the RCMP has improved its' monitoring and removal of dormant accounts, opportunities exist to improve the monitoring of inappropriate or unnecessary access. The RCMP has successfully implemented a transaction log review tool to enable timely review of user transactions for PROS; however, similar functionality should be implemented within SPROS. Finally, the RCMP should re-examine its approach to oversight and compliance with PROS policies to include a review function.
Management of record suspensions
Opportunities exist to enhance the RCMP's practices with respect to the processing of records suspensions (pardons) in physical records and files.
In its 2011 audit, the OPC examined whether the RCMP was managing personal information retained in PROS in compliance with information retention requirements stipulated in federal acts. The OPC found that the RCMP had developed policies and procedures, in accordance with applicable legislation, concerning how long information should be retained and when it should be disposed. However, the OPC found that the policies were not being followed and the RCMP was not purging records from PROS as required. As a result, information that should have been purged because it had reached its retention limit (as determined by the date of the longest sentence imposed as a result of an investigation) was still accessible. The OPC recommended that the RCMP purge PROS data that had reached established retention dates to be compliant with the Privacy Act. The RCMP accepted the recommendation, advising it would take immediate action.
The RCMP addressed this finding in 2012 and the majority of records to be removed had been successfully purged by the end of the year. While in 2013 there was an instance where a technical issue relating to a systems update resulted in the backlog of more than a million records, we were able to confirm that Applications Development Branch had effectively resolved the issue and the backlog had been purged. We also found that Applications Development Branch had taken measures to ensure that subsequent systems upgrades would not result in similar interruptions in the purging process.
Although the OPC audit resulted in changes with respect to purging of records in PROS, our examination determined that despite having similar record retention requirements, records are not being appropriately purged from SPROS. SPROS is built on the same platform as PROS and therefore has the same basic functionality; however, we found that the purge functionality within SPROS has not been enabled. As a result, the RCMP is at risk of being non-compliant with the provisions of the Privacy Act.
The OPC also found, while examining the purging process, that the RCMP had not yet established a process to remove pardoned offences and wrongful convictions from PROS. The OPC highlighted that if this information is not removed in a timely manner it could impact the privacy of individuals and hinder their employment opportunities, international travel, and volunteer activities.
A pardon, also referred to as a record suspension, allows individuals who were convicted of a criminal offence, but have completed their sentence and demonstrated they are law-abiding citizens, to have their criminal record kept separate and apart from other criminal recordsFootnote 6. This is also referred to as sequestering.
The OPC recommended that the RCMP implement processes to remove access to pardoned offences and wrongful convictions and the RCMP agreed to do so.
Accordingly, we expected to find that the RCMP was sequestering pardoned offences and wrongful convictions within PROS; we also expected to find that access to information relating to pardoned offences and wrongful convictions in hard copy records and files was being restricted.
We found that the Information Management Branch had developed detailed procedures on processing pardons within PROS. Within the RCMP, Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services (CCRTIS) receives notification of pardons or wrongful convictions from the Parole Board of Canada. CCRTIS sequesters the appropriate records in the CPIC system upon receipt of this information; it then advises the RCMP Divisions and police partner agencies that contributed information to the CPIC sequestered records. It is the responsibilities of those organizations to sequester the relevant records and information within other databases, i.e. PROS and SPROS. Information obtained through interviews revealed that CCRTIS has not always been timely in advising the divisions regarding record suspensions. The divisions typically receive the notifications in batches, and delays of several months have been noted.
Upon notification by CCRTIS, divisional information management coordinators query PROS, and sequester the appropriate records into a secure area within the system. Following the OPC audit, the RCMP created specific user-access profiles which only allow the specified users to access the sequestered records and information. Overall, based on our testing and discussions with management, we found that the RCMP had addressed the OPC's finding and recommendation concerning the sequestering of information in PROS. While the OPC did not review processes in place to sequester information in physical files, this was included as part of our audit scope. At the four visited divisions, varying practices were observed, some considerably more efficient than others.
While hard copy operational records and files can be maintained at the headquarters, divisional IM, or detachment levels, the majority of these records are held by detachments. Divisional IM offices review and sequester any divisionally-held records for their clients including federal units such as commercial crime, major case management, and border security. Divisional IM offices strive to address record suspensions promptly upon receipt, however considering the amount of administration involved and resource limitations, differing mitigation strategies had been implemented by the divisional IM offices. While the practices differed, division IM offices were all striving to ensure that the sequestered information is held separate and apart from other information as stipulated in the Criminal Records Act. We observed that while some divisional IM offices completed a detailed file review to determine what information needed to be sequestered, others completed only a cursory review or had no review process in place. In one division, where no detailed review was being done, complete files containing information that may relate to pardoned offences were flagged and stored in a separate location. These files would only be reviewed in detail to remove sequestered information if access to the file was sought by someone outside of the divisional IM organization. This observed practice does meet the Criminal Records Act requirement, and depending on the nature of the file and the availability of resources, could be a best practice in the efficient administration of this process.
In the case of detachments, there is no oversight or monitoring at either the divisional or national level, to ensure they are taking sufficient action to comply with the requirements for sequestering information related to a record suspension. Divisional Managers expressed concerns regarding the capacity of detachments to effectively manage this process given their other core duties. As the majority of the records are held at the detachment level, this poses significant risk.
Although the RCMP has addressed the issue of sequestering pardoned offences and wrongful convictions within PROS, there are opportunities to improve the timeliness of the process, and to implement more complete and efficient approaches to the sequestering of hard copy records and files.
4. Recommendations
The Deputy Commissioner, Contract and Aboriginal Policing, should assess, and enhance as appropriate, the practices in place to monitor user access to PROS; and the monitoring of risks relating to inappropriate access to PROS.
The Deputy Commissioner, Contract and Aboriginal Policing in collaboration with the Deputy Commissioner, Special Policing Services and the Chief Information Officer should establish a periodic review process to ensure users' compliance to the terms and conditions governing the use of PROS.
The Deputy Commissioner, Special Policing Services in collaboration with the Chief Information Officer and the Deputy Commissioner, Contract and Aboriginal Policing, should ensure that records are being appropriately purged from SPROS to be in compliance with the Privacy Act. Consideration should also be given towards enhancing SPROS user-monitoring capability by enabling a transaction log review tool.
The Deputy Commissioner, Special Policing Services in collaboration with the Chief Information Officer should assess existing record suspension (pardon) procedures, with respect to the vetting of physical records, to ensure divisions are following an efficient approach that meets the requirements of relevant Federal Acts.
5. Conclusion
Overall, the RCMP has effectively addressed the majority of the OPC's findings and recommendations. However, opportunities exist to further enhance the security of personal information maintained within RCMP operational databases by enhancing monitoring and compliance activities associated with the PROS database.
In addition, the RCMP should ensure that records are being appropriately purged from SPROS, in compliance with the Privacy Act. Consideration should also be given to enabling monitoring of SPROS users' activities by implementing a transaction log review tool.
Finally, with respect to the management of physical records and information that pertains to pardoned offences and wrongful convictions, the RCMP should consider enhancing existing record suspension (pardon) procedures, to establish a consistent and streamlined approach that meets the requirements of relevant Federal Acts.
Appendix A – Audit objectives and criteria
Objective: To determine whether processes in place to safeguard, maintain and destroy personal information are timely, effective and meet policy requirements.
Criterion 1: The RCMP has established and implemented procedures governing the access and use of personal information.
Criterion 2: The RCMP has established and implemented procedures, consistent with existing policies, to remove or make inaccessible, personal information.
Criterion 3: Ongoing technical requirements to maintain the security of personal information are being addressed.
Footnotes
Fentanyl seized in 2016
The RCMP is implementing a national investigative strategy that targets fentanyl importers, distributors, manufacturers and traffickers to disrupt, dismantle and prosecute international criminal groups.
British Columbia
March
Two industrial pill presses, as well as a large number of pills laced with fentanyl were seized in two clandestine drug laboratories in West Kelowna. As a result, four people were arrested.
April
Two people were arrested in Nanaimo following the seizure of approximately one ounce of suspected fentanyl.
West Shore RCMP also arrested two people for possession of drugs, including fentanyl.
September
Two people were arrested and charged for drug trafficking following a joint investigation between the Kitimat and Prince Rupert RCMP. As a result of the arrest, police seized over 1,200 tablets containing heroin and fentanyl.
October
Vancouver Island RCMP seized 1 kg of fentanyl during a routine traffic stop. The investigation is continuing.
November
Package of Furanyl-fentanyl from China was intercepted at the Vancouver International Mail Centre.
Yukon
April
As part of Project Green Manalishi, a lengthy and complex investigation targeting the trafficking of fentanyl and other drugs in the Northwest Territories, a total of 19 people have been charged.
Northwest Territories
December
A person was charged with importing, trafficking and possession of an illegal substance after furanylfentanyl was seized at a Yellowknife residence.
Alberta
June
1 kg of carfentanil from China was seized by the Canada Border Services Agency in Vancouver. A man was arrested and charged by Calgary RCMP.
RCMP Greater Toronto Area Serious and Organized Crime at Toronto Airport Detachment arrested a Brampton resident for illegally importing approximately 513 grams of powdered fentanyl.
Quebec
December
Canada Border Services Agency officers at Montréal-Mirabel International Airport intercepted 209 grams of carfentanil in two packages from China. The carfentanil was turned over to the RCMP and the investigation is continuing.
Nova Scotia
June
RCMP South Shore Integrated Street Crime Enforcement Unit charged a man for possession of fentanyl and other drugs following the search of a home in Bayswater.
Newfoundland and Labrador
September
Eight members and two associates of the Vikings Motorcycle Club, an Outlaw Motorcycle Gang were arrested and charged as part of Project BOMBARD, including for trafficking fentanyl.
Saisies de Fentanyl en 2016
La GRC met en œuvre une stratégie d'enquête nationale visant les importateurs, distributeurs, producteurs et trafiquants de fentanyl afin de perturber, démanteler et poursuivre en justice les groupes criminels internationaux.
Colombie-Britannique
Mars
Deux presses à comprimés industrielles ainsi qu'une grande quantité de comprimés contenant du fentanyl ont été saisies dans deux laboratoires clandestins à West Kelowna. Quatre personnes ont été arrêtées dans cette affaire.
Avril
Deux personnes ont été arrêtées à Nanaimo après la saisie d'environ une once de ce qu'on croit être du fentanyl.
La GRC de West Shore a également arrêté deux personnes pour possession de drogue, dont du fentanyl.
Septembre
Deux personnes ont été arrêtées et une accusée de trafic de drogue à la suite d'une enquête menée conjointement par les détachements de la GRC de Kitimat et Prince-Rupert. Ces arrestations se sont soldées par la saisie de plus de 1200 comprimés contenant de l'héroïne et du fentanyl.
Octobre
La GRC de l'île de Vancouver a saisi 1 kg de fentanyl lors d'un contrôle routier de routine. L'enquête se poursuit.
Novembre
Un colis contenant du furanyl-fentanyl en provenance de Chine a été intercepté au centre de traitement du courrier international de Vancouver.
Yukon
Avril
Dans le cadre du projet Green Manalishi, une enquête longue et complexe sur le trafic de fentanyl et d'autres drogues dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest, 19 personnes ont été accusées.
Territoires du Nord-Ouest
Décembre
Une personne a été accusée d'importation, de trafic et de possession d'une substance illégale après la saisie de furanyl-fentanyl dans une résidence de Yellowknife.
Des membres de l'équipe de lutte contre les crimes graves et le crime organisé de la région du Grand Toronto du Détachement de la GRC à l'aéroport de Toronto ont arrêté un résident de Brampton pour importation illégale d'environ 513 grammes de poudre de fentanyl.
Québec
Décembre
Des employés de l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC) en poste à l'aéroport international de Mirabel, à Montréal ont intercepté 209 grammes de carfentanil dans deux colis en provenance de Chine. La substance a été confiée à la GRC et l'enquête se poursuit.
Nouvelle-Écosse
Juin
Le Groupe de répression des crimes de la GRC de South Shore a accusé un homme de possession de fentanyl et d'autres drogues à la suite d'une perquisition effectuée dans une résidence de Bayswater.
Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador
Septembre
Huit membres et deux associés du club de motards Vikings, une bande de motards criminalisés, ont été arrêtés et accusés entre autres de trafic de fentanyl dans le cadre du projet BOMBARD.
Le fentanyl est un puissant analgésique obtenu sur ordonnance qui est environ 100 fois plus toxique que la morphine.
De nos jours, le fentanyl est importé et vendu illégalement, ce qui entraîne des conséquences tragiques.
Faits
Le fentanyl est parfois mélangé à d'autres drogues, notamment à l'héroïne et à la cocaïne.
Il est utilisé sous forme de comprimés qui ressemblent à des médicaments vendus sur ordonnance.
Des surdoses se sont produites chez des personnes qui ne savaient même pas qu'elles avaient consommé du fentanyl.
Le fentanyl est difficile à détecter, car il est sans odeur et sans goût.
Il est souvent sous forme de poudre, de pilules, de liquide ou de buvards.
Deux milligrammes de fentanyl pur, soit l'équivalent de quatre grains de sel, peuvent suffire à tuer un adulte moyen.
L'exposition involontaire au fentanyl pur - le fait d'en toucher ou d'en inhaler - peut causer des méfaits graves, voire la mort.
Le nombre de décès attribuables au fentanyl est à la hausse au Canada.
Voici d'autres noms utilisés pour le fentanyl
Apache, China Girl, China White, Dance Fever, Friend, Goodfella, Green beans, Jackpot, Murder 8, Shady 80s, TNT et Tango and Cash.
Signes et symptômes d'une surdose
Somnolence grave
Respiration lente et superficielle
Bleuissement des lèvres et des ongles
Absence de réaction de la personne
Gargouillis ou ronflements
Peau froide et moite
Contraction des pupilles
Naloxone
La naloxone est un médicament qui peut inverser temporairement les effets d'une surdose d'opioïdes. Ses effets se dissipent après 30 à 90 minutes. Il est donc important d'obtenir d'autres soins médicaux.
Si vous soupçonnez qu'une personne fait une surdose
Composez immédiatement le 911.
Conseils pour discuter avec les jeunes
Renseignez-les sur les méfaits et les conséquences.
Discutez de façon calme tout en demeurant réceptif.
Évitez de leur faire la leçon, de les menacer ou de les juger.
Discutez de l'influence des pairs et de moyens de refuser la drogue.
