Vol. 77, No. 1Featured submission

Research and response

Police considerations in active shooter events

NYPD officers perform threshold evaluation movements under the guidance of ALERRT instructors. Credit: Diane Hendricks, ALERRT

By

Active shooter events are tragic to the victims, their families, the immediate community and the nation. However, little to no research into the events had been accomplished until recently.

Researchers at the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response (ALERRT) program and Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas, initially began analyzing active shooter events in the United States following the first attack on the U.S. Amy base at Fort Hood in 2009. At the time, there were no systematic analyses of active shooters. Their efforts resulted in multiple publications that instituted a thorough methodological approach to data collection.

Following the 2012 attack on Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), acting on a directive from the Attorney General, undertook the task of compiling and analyzing active shooter events. In turn, the FBI worked with researchers from ALERRT and Texas State University to complete the study released in September 2014. This partnership allowed for a deeper analysis of active shooter events.

The goal of the study was to provide federal, state and local law enforcement agencies with the most accurate data regarding active shooter events. The agencies can use these data to better understand how to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from these tragic events.

What the data show

In total, the research team identified 160 incidents occurring between the years 2000 and 2013 that met the federal definition of an active shooter event — "an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area." The research team gathered official police reports from the responding agencies to have the most accurate data possible.

The analysis revealed several trends and informative data points.

  1. Active shooter events appear to be increasing in frequency. An average of 6.4 events occurred during the first seven years studied, while an average of 16.4 events occurred during the last seven years. There was a single event in 2001; however, 2010 had the highest total with 26 events.
  2. No geographic trends were found. The events occurred throughout the nation.
  3. The events ended quickly. Of the events where duration could be calculated, 69 per cent were over within five minutes.
  4. As a testament to the speed of events, 60 per cent of the events ended before police arrived on scene.
  5. The study found 1,043 victims. Of these, 486 died and 557 were wounded.
  6. There is no true "profile" of an active shooter. Only six shooters were female. However, shooters ranged from age 13 to 88. Additionally, all major races were represented at approximately the same ratio found in the population.
  7. Businesses were the most prevalent attack location with a little over 45 per cent of events occurring at a retail store, office or warehouse. Approximately 24 per cent of events occurred at schools.

Event resolutions

The most interesting and useful outcomes from the data are seen when analyzing the event resolutions. The report found the majority of events (55 per cent) ended before law enforcement officers arrive on scene.

The 55 per cent can be broken down further: 37 per cent ended with the shooter committing suicide, fleeing or moving to another location to commit suicide. Civilians stopped the shooter the remaining 18 per cent of the time. The 45 per cent of events ending after police officers arrive on scene can be broken down to shooter- or police-initiated outcomes.

Sixteen percent of the time, the shooter commits suicide or surrenders to law enforcement. The remaining 29 per cent of events end due to law enforcement intervention, with the majority of these resulting in the officers shooting the shooter (22 per cent).

In 45 active shooter events, law enforcement exchanged gunfire with the shooter. Twenty-one of these events resulted in five law enforcement officers being killed and 28 wounded. With 72 events (45 per cent) ending after police arrive on scene, this equates to officers being wounded or killed in action 29.2 per cent of the time when they arrive to an active shooter still in progress. This makes an active shooter response the most dangerous call an officer will respond to.

Response considerations

The researchers believe law enforcement officers can benefit from the results of the study in two key ways. First, the speed of the events illustrates the need for agencies to undertake a realistic examination of their response policies. In the wake of the attack on Columbine High School, law enforcement agencies adjusted their policies away from establishing a perimeter and waiting on a SWAT team.

Agencies began to train patrol officers to form teams and advance to the threat. With an average duration of only five minutes, every second counts. Smaller or rural law enforcement agencies may experience slower response times due to a lower officer density. These, and larger agencies, may evaluate the necessity to train officers for solo-officer entries instead of requiring officers to wait for a team to form.

Second, the most recent advancement in active shooter training for law enforcement officers revolves around the facilitation of medical treatment. Recall that 1,043 civilians were killed or wounded during the 160 events. Law enforcement officers will be the first responders. Once the officers have stopped the killing, they should be prepared to help stop the dying.

In order to be prepared, it's suggested that agencies train and equip patrol officers with medical kits. The medical kits should contain tourniquets and coagulate chemicals to halt the loss of blood. In addition to medical training, law enforcement agencies should cross-train with local fire and EMS agencies. These agencies have more advanced medical knowledge and strong communication between law enforcement, fire and EMS saves lives.

The importance of integration for these agencies is best seen when analyzing the Aurora, Colo., theater attack. Law enforcement staged in one parking lot while fire and EMS staged a few hundred yards away. Neither communicated well and the police officers ended up transporting patients in the back of their cars. This overloaded the closest emergency rooms and interfered with the hospitals ability to care for the influx of wounded.

Civilian response

The resolution data also present key policies in regards to civilian response to active shooter events. Remember that 55 per cent of active shooter events concluded before police arrived on scene. Twenty-nine of these events (18 per cent) ended because of direct civilian action.

ALERRT has developed a Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE) course to train law enforcement officers how to teach civilians to properly respond to a dynamic situation to save themselves. The core of this training is a basic system known as Avoid, Deny, Defend (ADD).

Avoid. The first response is to get away from the threat. If it's possible, civilians should leave the area in which the shooting is occurring to avoid the shooter. It's important they move far enough away from the location of the event to be safe. In the case of a fire, this is often across the street. In an active shooter event, more distance (often a few blocks) is usually required to ensure both that the shooter can't shoot at civilians from inside the building, and to ensure that if the shooter moves from his current location, civilians don't end up in the line of fire again.

Deny. If it's unsafe to leave the current location to avoid the shooter, the next step is to take actions that will deny him access to the location. This is not hiding. It's doing whatever it takes to prevent the shooter from getting into the location. The simplest action, and one that has been extremely effective in the active shooter events studied, is to lock the door to the room. In the attacks that have occurred in the U.S., no shooter has breached a locked door. Locks that can be secured without the use of a key will be more useful in a crisis than locks that require one (putting a key into a lock is a fine motor activity that will likely be impaired in an active shooter attack).

Not all locations have doors that can be locked. If the door opens inward to the room, furniture can be used to barricade the door. Doorstops or other items can be wedged between the door and floor or frame to prevent it from opening. Unfortunately, if the door opens outward (which is commonly required under modern building codes) and does not have a lock, denying access becomes much more difficult. It might be possible to use a rope to tie the door handle to something else, but this will be difficult to do under stress.

Defend. If civilians are unable to avoid the shooter or prevent him from gaining access to the location, there is only one option left. They must defend themselves. There are many active shooter events where the people on the scene were able to subdue the attacker and save their own lives. There are different techniques, including swarming the shooter, advantageous positioning at a door entry to surprise the shooter, and using any object to protect oneself.

Conclusion

These key findings and policy considerations stemmed from a systematic examination of active shooter events. To sum, the researchers found that events appear to occur more frequently, are generally over in under five minutes and before police arrive on scene, and the events occur most frequently in businesses, followed by schools. Furthermore, civilians can have a direct, powerful impact on how the events end. As such, the researchers believe that training should focus on civilian response in addition to the rigorous training undertaken by law enforcement.

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