Evaluation of the RCMP Enhanced Security Screening Pilot Project

September 29, 2015

This report has been reviewed in consideration of the Access to Information and Privacy Acts. The asterisks [***] appear where information has been removed; published information is UNCLASSIFIED.

Table of Contents

• Acronyms
• Executive Summary
• 1.0 Introduction
  • 1.1 Background
  • 1.2 Program Profile and Funding
  • 1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation
  • 1.4 Methodology and Approach
  • 1.5 Considerations and Limitations
• 2.0 Findings
  • 2.1 Pilot Implementation
    • 2.1.1 Timing of the Pilot
    • 2.1.2 Resources Assigned to Deliver the Pilot
    • 2.1.3 Process to Conduct the Screening
    • 2.1.4 Scope of the Screening Process
  • 2.2 Performance
    • 2.2.1 Efficiency
    • 2.2.2 Effectiveness
  • 2.3 Relevance
    • 2.3.1 Need to Conduct the RCMP Screening
    • 2.3.2 Alignment with RCMP and Government-Wide Priorities
    • 2.3.3 Alignment with the federal and legislative obligations of the RCMP
• 3.0 Conclusions
  • Performance
  • Relevance
• Annex A – Evaluation Matrix
• Annex B – List of Documents
• Annex C – Interview Guides

Acronyms

AVRR

Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration

BRRA

Balanced Refugee Reform Act

CBSA

Canada Border Services Agency

CIC

Citizenship and Immigration Canada

CSIS

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

DCO

Designated Country of Origin

FESS

Front-End Security Screening

FTE

Full-time equivalent

ICAS

In-Canada Asylum System

IRB

Immigration and Refugee Board

IRPA

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act

LERC

Law Enforcement Records Check

MACAD

Monitoring, Analysis, and Country Assessment Division

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

NSSD

National Security Screening Division

OAG

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

PCISA

Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act

POE

Port of Entry

RCC

Refugee Claimant Continuum

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RPD

Refugee Protection Division

SIBS

Security Intelligence Background Section

TB

Treasury Board

Executive Summary

What we examined:

The evaluation of the Enhanced Screening Pilot Project was conducted between June and August 2014 by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The initial draft report was prepared by CIC in collaboration with the RCMP; finalization and approvals became the responsibility of the RCMP. The evaluation was conducted in compliance with commitments made during the development of the reforms to the In-Canada Asylum System (ICAS) in 2010.

The objectives of the evaluation were to evaluate the implementation, early results and relevance of the pilot in helping to ensure that persons who may be inadmissible to Canada due to organized criminal activities, are not allowed to remain in the country; thereby maintaining the integrity of the refugee determination system. The evaluation included:

• a review of the degree to which the pilot was implemented as originally intended;
• an assessment of the achievement of targets related to the number of screenings to be undertaken by the RCMP;
• the results and timeliness of the screenings undertaken, given requirements under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and legislated timelines established for the completion of hearings under the ICAS; and
• the overall relevance of the pilot.

The evaluation was national in scope and covered $16 million in funding between 2011/12 and 2015/16. The evaluation examined the pilot activities from its launch in January 2013 to June 2014.

What we found:

Pilot implementation:

• While the pilot was implemented as intended, in that the RCMP established a process within its organization to screen a portion of refugee claimants against existing law enforcement databases, modifications were made to processes and procedures in order to address challenges identified during the early stages of implementation.

Achievement of screening target:

• Despite problems encountered in transmitting and completing screenings, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and RCMP have largely been able to achieve the target to screen 40% of claimants in the 2013/14 fiscal year.

Results and timeliness of screening:

• The screening process has resulted in the identification of positive findings of concern in 2% of screened cases.
• Prior to the reforms, screening was undertaken on claimants who had been in Canada 18 to 24 months or more, as opposed to 1-2 months under the new asylum system. Given that domestic law-enforcement databases are more likely to contain information important to admissibility recommendations for populations which have been in Canada for a longer period of time, minimal information on claimants was available under the new system.
• For the most part, the RCMP delivered screening results within legislated timelines. The RCMP signalled to CBSA the potential need for an extension on behalf of Canadian law enforcement partners for some screenings with a positive result, to allow them the time needed to complete their work.
• The RCMP screening results feed into a larger Front-End Security Screening process with specific timeliness for completion. Despite this, at times CBSA used a risk based approach in order to manage the Front-End Security Screening (FESS) process and proceeded without the RCMP screening findings.

Relevance of the Pilot:

• Given difficulties encountered during the implementation of the pilot, the short period of time during which the pilot has been functioning, the low likelihood under current IRPA requirements that information indicating inadmissibility will appear in Canadian law enforcement databases, and the limited use of RCMP screening results by CBSA in assessing admissibility, it is not clear to what extent the RCMP screening process can, as currently implemented, contribute to admissibility recommendations.
• Security screening is consistent with RCMP, CIC and CBSA strategic outcomes and priorities and has been identified as a priority area for the Government of Canada through the Speech from the Throne.
• Given legislative requirements, the screening conducted through the pilot project is within the roles and responsibilities of the federal government, and the RCMP is the appropriate federal government entity to conduct this screening.

Recommendations:

Recommendation #1: The RCMP should determine, based on the results of the evaluation and given the current requirements under IRPA, whether the screening pilot in its current form, should be continued.

Recommendation #2: If the pilot is re-initiated, CIC, CBSA and the RCMP should jointly agree on and clarify the scope of the screening to be undertaken by the RCMP by defining the type of information that is relevant when assessing the admissibility of refugee claimants.

Recommendation #3: If the pilot is re-initiated, the RCMP and the CBSA should prioritize ongoing consultations on interpretations of information-sharing policies, procedures and third party rules and arrive at a workable solution to improve the relevance and timeliness of information shared during the screening process.

Recommendation #4: If the pilot is re-initiated, based on the results of recommendations #2 and #3, clearly communicated objectives should be provided to program staff conducting and receiving the screening information. In addition, a mechanism should be instituted to allow for on-going feedback on the utility and impact the information provided had on the outcome of each file.

Management Response:

Senior officials responsible for the RCMP Screening Pilot reviewed the evaluation of the RCMP Enhanced Security Screening Pilot and accept its findings.

The RCMP established a process to screen a portion of refugee claimants against existing law enforcement databases and shared the results with the CBSA to feed their larger front-end screening process that contributes information to hearings being held for refugees. The pilot focused on specific requirements of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (sections 34, 35 and 37), with an emphasis on organized criminal activities. The evaluation concluded that, based on these requirements, the pilot has not had any impact on the admissibility recommendations made by the CBSA.

The pilot concluded on March 31, 2015. In view of the evaluation's findings and IRPA requirements, the RCMP will not seek to re-initiate the pilot.

1.0 Introduction

This report presents the results of the Evaluation of the RCMP Enhanced Screening Pilot Project (the pilot). The evaluation was conducted by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), between June and August 2014. The initial draft report was prepared by CIC in collaboration with the RCMP; finalization and approvals became the responsibility of the RCMP. The evaluation was conducted in compliance with commitments made during the development of the reforms to the In-Canada Asylum System (ICAS) in 2010. This evaluation also meets the requirement of the Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation, which calls for all departmental direct program spending to be evaluated on a five-year cycle.

1.1 Background

The Enhanced Screening Pilot Project was introduced as a component of reforms to the In-Canada Asylum System, and was launched in December of 2012.

The key objectives of the ICAS are to continue to meet Canada's domestic and international legal obligations to protect those in need, through arriving at faster decisions that result in offering refugee protection to those who deserve it and faster removal of those whose claims are rejected, while protecting and maintaining the integrity of the system against those who may abuse it.^{Footnote 1} To this end, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA) introduced regulated processing times for claimants and new structures and processes to expedite claims. The BRRA also introduced three pilots led by the following departments: Enhanced Screening by the RCMP, Ministerial Reviews and Interventions by CIC, and Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).^{Footnote 2} The Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act (PCISA) subsequently expanded upon some of the measures originally introduced in the BRRA; however, the pilots remained unchanged.

Historically, the role of the RCMP in the screening process for refugee claimants has been to undertake name-based and fingerprint checks on individuals referred by the CBSA or CIC. These checks have served to determine if an individual has been charged or convicted of a criminal offence in Canada as well as whether they have previously applied for and been refused refugee status in Canada.

The key objectives of the Enhanced Screening Pilot Project are to:

• Ensure that persons who are inadmissible because of membership in criminal organizations do not remain in Canada, threatening the safety and security of Canadians; and to
• Maintain the integrity of the refugee determination system.^{Footnote 3}

^*** through the pilot, the RCMP conducts Law Enforcement Records Checks (LERCs) – a per-applicant comprehensive analysis of available information from Canadian police databases – on a portion of refugee claims for the purpose of contributing information related to inadmissibility pursuant to sections 34, 35 and 37 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) to the refugee determination system.^{Footnote 4} Section 34 renders inadmissible for entry into Canada those who have engaged in espionage, subversion or terrorism and those who belong to organizations which engage in such acts. Section 35 renders individuals inadmissible on the grounds of violating human or international rights as defined in the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. Section 37 renders inadmissible those who belong to groups involved in organized criminal activity or who engage in transnational crimes such as people smuggling, trafficking in people or money laundering.^{Footnote 5} These LERCs draw upon Canadian police databases not previously used in the assessment of asylum claims, providing the opportunity for a more complete screening for organized criminality concerns. The purpose of the screening is to determine if an individual has in the past engaged in and/or been associated with criminal activities that should inform admissibility decisions.

The pilot project seeks to leverage RCMP expertise and access to Canadian law enforcement information regarding organized criminality, to ensure that all pertinent and available information is provided to FESS officers. The addition of the review of LERCs provides a mechanism for that information to be provided to the CBSA.

As with the larger ICAS, the pilot requires the coordinated actions of partners from across several departments and agencies:

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Security Intelligence Background Section (RCMP-SIBS): coordinates the conduct of LERCs; is responsible for screening referred claims and reporting on results to the CBSA;
• The Canada Border Services Agency, National Security Screening Division (CBSA-NSSD): acts as the coordinator and the main focal point for this pilot; is responsible for referring selected claims to the RCMP for screening; receives results of screenings for incorporation into admissibility recommendations; and
• Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Monitoring, Analysis, and Country Assessment Division (CIC-MACAD): receives information on the number and outcomes of screenings conducted; is responsible for higher-level program oversight.

The provision of enhanced screening information is guided by a process that coordinates the actions of the pilot project's delivery partners. Focusing on the role of the RCMP SIBS, the steps followed for the enhanced screening are as follows:

1. CBSA-NSSD selects and transmits a daily sample of claimant applications to SIBS.
2. a) Based on the biographical information provided, SIBS conducts a LERC of accessible law enforcement databases to determine if an individual has in the past engaged in, and/or associated him/her-self to individuals involved in criminal activities.
   b) If the information received is incomplete for a valid screening, SIBS notifies CBSA-NSSD and requests additional available information.
3. SIBS reviews and analyzes the information uncovered during the checks.
4. When the relevant information surfaced during the checks belongs to another law enforcement agency, SIBS must request the claimant's signed consent form from CBSA-NSDD. It is then forwarded to the law enforcement agency along with the request for permission to release the information they hold.
5. SIBS provides CBSA-NSSD with the results for all claimants screened, and a full LERC report for claims where adverse information was found. When negative results are based on incomplete information, CBSA is notified of such. Exhibit 1 provides the enhanced screening results categories.
6. On a monthly basis, SIBS provides a statistical report to CIC-MACAD on the number of concluded tasks and the SIBS LERC assessment result. Exhibit 2 provides the law enforcement concern categories.

Exhibit 1: Enhanced Screening Results Categories

• Negative: an analysis of the information initially provided and queried allowed SIBS to confirm that there were no grounds for concern with regard to the case screened;
• Negative, Further Information Required: an analysis of the information initially provided led to a request for additional claimant information provided by CBSA-NSSD, allowing SIBS to ultimately confirm that there were no grounds for concern with regard to the case screened;
• Positive, Further Information Required: an analysis of the information initially provided led to a request for additional claimant information provided by CBSA-NSSD, allowing SIBS to ultimately confirm that there were grounds for concern with regard to the case screened.

Exhibit 2: Law Enforcement Concern Categories

• Criminal activity: a person who has been entered on a police data bank as known to be involved or suspected to be involved in various criminality;
• Criminal association: a person who has been entered on a police data bank as being seen or in the physical presence of a known person(s) who are involved in criminal activities or have been charged and convicted of a criminal offence;
• Criminal conviction: a person is found on police data banks as a result of being charged with a criminal offence, found guilty and sentenced by the courts; and
• Criminal other: a person recorded in police data banks as being arrested or arrested and charged and the situation remains at that stage (i.e., is pending).

The assessments are then provided to CBSA officers engaged in the Front-End Security Screening (FESS) of refugee claims. The aim of the FESS process is to strengthen the integrity of the refugee determination system and enhance the safety of all Canadians and national security, by identifying and filtering potential security cases from the refugee claimant population as early as possible. FESS officers provide recommendations with respect to the eligibility of claimants for refugee claim hearings, based on inadmissibility reasons detailed in IRPA, using information assembled by CBSA staff that includes information provided by partners such as the RCMP.

1.2 Program Profile and Funding

The RCMP originally received $16 million in funding over four years beginning in 2010/11 for the Enhanced Screening Pilot Project through the BRRA and the PCISA, as part of the new ICAS. Because of the delay in the coming-into-force of the new ICAS until December 15, 2012, existing funds were reprofiled and the pilot was extended for an additional year (see Section 2.1.2 for further discussion). The table below shows the revised funding profile for the pilot:

Source: CIC-MACAD, November 2014.

These funds were utilized by the RCMP to deliver the pilot project. In each fiscal year of operation, the pilot project was set a target number of claims to be sent for screening, based on the annual number of asylum claims: 30% for 2012/13, and 40% for 2013/14 and 2014/15. Between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014, over 4,000 screenings were completed (Table 1.2).

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014

During the reporting period, 85 positive findings of concern were found, representing 2.08% of the total number of claims screened. Negative findings and negative findings based on additional information represented 81.76% and 16.16% of the claims screened, respectively (Table 1.3).

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

Recognizing that a refugee claim screening could result in multiple types of criminality concerns being identified, positive results (i.e. 85 cases) included cases of criminal association, convictions, other criminal activity and other largely immigration-related matters which did not meet the requirements for inadmissibility under sections 34, 35 and 37 of IRPA. A further breakdown for the three results categories is presented in Table 1.4.

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation was national in scope, and covered the period from January 2013 to June 2014. Recognizing that the pilot was recently established, the evaluation was designed to examine its implementation, early results, and relevance. More specifically, the objectives of the evaluation were to report on the:

1. Implementation of the pilot, in terms of the degree to which the following elements of the pilot project were implemented as planned:
   • The timing of the pilot;
   • The resources assigned to deliver the pilot;
   • The process to be used to conduct the screening; and
   • The scope of the screening process; the
2. Performance of the pilot in terms of:
   • Its efficiency in undertaking the screening process; and
   • Its effectiveness in identifying potential security issues and providing information that was used in the development of admissibility recommendations; and the
3. Relevance of the pilot, in terms of:
   • The need to conduct the RCMP screening;
   • The pilot's alignment with RCMP and government-wide priorities; and
   • The degree to which the screening is aligned with the federal and legislative obligations of the RCMP.

The evaluation matrix, containing the full set of evaluation questions, indicators, and data sources assessed, can be found in Annex A.

1.4 Methodology and Approach

The evaluation followed the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation and the Treasury Board Secretariat's Directive on the Evaluation Function. Multiple lines of evidence were used to assess the performance and relevance of the pilot, and to develop evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations:

Document Review: internal and external documentation was reviewed to gather contextual information about the pilot. Documents reviewed included Reports on Plans and Priorities, performance reports produced by the SIBS and CIC, operational guidance documents, reviews and audits, and other applicable information. A list of key documents reviewed can be found in Annex B.

Analysis of Administrative and Performance Data: available financial, administrative, and performance data were used to provide information on the relevance and performance of the screening pilot project. The interdepartmental Refugee Claimant Continuum (RCC), managed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was analyzed to profile the number and type of cases screened, as well as their outcomes. RCMP quality assurance reports provided information on the receipt and completion of cases to be screened, as well as on issues encountered during implementation. Financial data were used to support the calculation of the cost per screening.

Key Informant Interviews: interviews were conducted to collect information on the implementation of the pilot. The interviews were conducted with representatives from the three departments and agencies involved in the pilot. Where appropriate, group interviews were conducted. In total, 22 interviews with 31 individuals were completed with the following groups:

• RCMP: 11 interviews conducted with a total of 14 individuals;
• CBSA: 6 interviews conducted with a total of 9 individuals; and
• CIC: 5 interviews conducted with a total of 8 individuals.

Interview guides can be found in Annex C.

1.5 Considerations and Limitations

Although the evaluation of the Enhanced Screening Pilot Project was subject to some limitations as noted below, they were satisfactorily resolved and did not detract from the overall rigor of the evaluation:

Timing limitations: because of the delays in the coming-into-force of the new ICAS, the evaluation was only able to assess administrative data as of the beginning of the 2013 calendar year. This reduced the ability to determine the extent to which the pilot contributed towards the achievement of longer-term outcomes, and the ability of the evaluation to assess the extent of this progress. This limitation will be overcome in the horizontal evaluation of the ICAS changes, which will incorporate evidence from this evaluation and collect further information from administrative data sources.

Data limitations: the evaluation drew upon administrative data from both the RCMP and the interdepartmental Refugee Claimant Continuum (RCC) managed by CIC. In some cases, ensuring alignment of the information obtained through these sources was a challenge; this was because the different databases are subject to different business rules; a lag was also observed between the provision of information by the RCMP and its appearance in RCC results. This limitation was overcome through employing a consistent approach to the use of data, and also through extensive validation of the results obtained.

Alternately, the evaluation was strengthened by the level of cooperation provided by partner organizations. Individuals within the RCMP, CBSA, and CIC, as well as program and evaluation officer contacts, all made themselves freely available to support the collection of data for this evaluation. This was particularly appreciated of program staff who were subject to operational pressures.

These strengths and limitations were taken into account when developing the findings, recommendations, and conclusions put forward in this evaluation.

2.0 Findings

2.1 Pilot Implementation

The evaluation looked at the degree to which the following elements of the pilot project were implemented as planned:

• The timing of the pilot;
• The resources assigned to deliver the pilot;
• The process to be used to conduct the screening; and
• The scope of the screening process.

2.1.1 Timing of the Pilot

The pilot project was originally scheduled to begin with the coming into force of new legislation in December, 2011, and to operate until March 31, 2015. The coming-into-force date was revised to June, 2012 and again to December 15, 2012 in order to accommodate amendments to the original Bill. With the termination of funding, the pilot ended on March 31, 2015.

The detailed project schedule for the pilot indicates that initial hiring was completed in May 2012, six months prior to the finalized coming-into-force date, and that initial training of staff was completed in June 2012. Interviews with RCMP representatives indicated that the delay provided an opportunity for individuals who had been hired in anticipation of the earlier coming-into-force date to become more familiar with the new legislation. These individuals were also engaged to support other programs within the RCMP during this period.

RCMP interviewees did not identify any negative impacts of the delay in the coming-into-force date for the pilot, other than the need to reprofile funding (see next section, below).

2.1.2 Resources Assigned to Deliver the Pilot

The RCMP was originally allocated the following number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) staff to undertake the pilot (Table 2.1):

• 9 FTEs in 2011/12, 21 FTEs in 2012/13 and 25 FTEs in both 2013/14 and 2014/15 to conduct screenings;
• 1 FTE from 2011/12 to 2014/15 to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the new security screening process and work with partners to help develop and support the security screening process; and
• 2 FTEs in 2011/12 and 4 FTEs in each of the subsequent years, to support the incremental operational resources.

Source: CIC-MACAD, July 2014.

At the time of the evaluation, 27.5 actual FTEs were assigned to the pilot to conduct screenings, and 1 FTE was assigned to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the security screening process. Resourcing issues were raised in only two interviews conducted as part of the evaluation. In one interview, it was mentioned that high turnover rates presented a challenge in ensuring the timely provision of screening results, while in another interview the turnover rate was associated with a need to retrain and re-educate staff on the intent of the screening project. It was also noted that the process to identify, hire, and obtain security clearance for new employees was a lengthy process.

The pilot was originally allocated a total budget of $4 Million per year, for a total of $16 Million (Table 2.2).

Source: Costing tables, RCMP.

The delay in the coming-into-force date resulted in the need to reprofile funding. In March 2012, a reprofiling exercise was undertaken to transfer $1.3M in funds to 2013/14 and $1.6M in funds to 2014/15. This reprofiling was accepted (Table 2.3).

Source: CIC-MACAD, November 2014.

2.1.3 Process to Conduct the Screening

During the early implementation of the pilot, a number of issues arose that resulted in modifications to the original design, including the way in which the information was transmitted from the CBSA to the RCMP, as well as how refugee claimants were selected for screening.

Information Transmission from the CBSA to the RCMP

Issues with the transmission of information between the CBSA and the RCMP were mentioned in RCMP-SIBS reports, as well as during interviews conducted with both organizations.

While no funding was provided for IT system development as part of the pilot, it was understood at the outset that the CBSA would need to transmit information electronically to the RCMP. In the beginning, the intent was to adapt existing systems, used to transmit information for other purposes. An outline of the work that would be required to adapt the existing system for use in the pilot was discussed. The CBSA proposed to leverage as much of the existing system as possible, given the lack of funding for IT system development and the time-limited nature of the pilot.

Based on this starting point, efforts were made to adapt existing systems; however, concerns regarding privacy issues (i.e., the RCMP needed to ensure that it would only receive the specific data required to conduct the screening), and the requirement to randomly select only a percentage of all cases for screening could not be accommodated without making changes to the existing system at significant expense. As a result, it was determined that an automated solution was not feasible, and a manual approach was adopted, with the understanding that should the pilot become permanent, an electronic solution would need to be implemented.

Claimants to be Screened

The original proposal put forward for the pilot was to screen 100% of refugee claimants; however, due to budget constraints, the percentage was revised downward and a phased-in approach was identified in planning documents (20% in 2011/12, 30% in 2012/13, and 40% in 2013/14 and 2014/15). With the change in the coming-into-force date to December 2012, the 2011/12 target became moot. As a result it was agreed that 30% of all adult refugee claimants would be referred to the RCMP for enhanced screening in 2012/13, and 40% in both 2013/14 and 2014/15.

In order to avoid workload surges, the pilot did not originally allow for "roll back" days should the target number of claims not be met (i.e., if there were no screening requests sent by the CBSA-NSSD to the RCMP on a given day, two lists could not to be sent to the RCMP the following day to account for the difference).^{Footnote 7} However, due to difficulties in consistently meeting daily targets, CBSA interviewees indicated that "roll back" days were instituted as of Q1 of 2014 in order to increase the likelihood that the targeted percentage of screenings would be met.

In addition, while not explicitly identified in program documents, RCMP interviewees noted that the original intent of the pilot was to screen those applicants who had been in the country the longest, as RCMP partner databases only contain information related to domestic law-enforcement. Refugee claims can be made either upon arrival, at a Port of Entry (POE), or after arrival, at an inland office. The RCMP expected to receive claims made at inland offices as it was felt they would include applicants who had been in the country the longest, rather than those made at POEs. However, in the first few months of implementation, the majority of cases referred to the RCMP for screening were POE claims due to difficulties encountered by the CBSA in collecting information from inland offices. This challenge was identified by the RCMP, and as of March 2013, the vast majority of cases referred to the RCMP for screening were from inland offices (90% or more on a monthly basis). POE claims are still referred to the RCMP when required in order to meet screening targets (Table 2.4).

Source: CIC Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

Lastly, ***. This was done in order to decrease the number of times the RCMP needed to request additional information or ask for verification of information previously received from the CBSA. This change was put in place in May 2013^{Footnote 8}.

2.1.4 Scope of the Screening Process

Foundational documents for the pilot indicate that the RCMP would conduct Law Enforcement Record Checks (LERCs) in relation to the inadmissibility criteria under the IRPA. These specify that CBSA-NSSD would also conduct checks for war crimes, crimes against humanity, organized crimes and security-related concerns pursuant to section 34, 35 and 37 of IRPA on select front-end screening cases, as well as coordinate with CSIS and the RCMP to ensure that screening is complete prior to the IRB hearing.^{Footnote 9}

During the planning phase for the pilot, the RCMP, in conjunction with CIC and the CBSA, defined four categories of law enforcement concerns to be reported to CIC for the purposes of ongoing monitoring and reporting: criminal convictions, criminal activity, criminal association and other^{Footnote 10}. These categories are broader than the requirements outlined in the foundational documents and in many cases are related to activities identified under Section 36^{Footnote 11} of IRPA, which the RCMP felt should be included in the screening. In conducting the screening, the RCMP does not associate positive findings of concern with specific admissibility sections of the IRPA when it forwards information to the CBSA, but rather provides all information that the RCMP deems to be of an adverse nature. This includes all information indicating a claimant has engaged in criminal activity and/or has known associations to criminal activities. It also includes information regarding illegal activities that are neither organized crime nor terrorism, as they are deemed by the RCMP to potentially represent a risk to public safety and/or national security.

2.2 Performance

The evaluation assessed the performance of the pilot in terms of:

• Its efficiency in undertaking the screening process; and
• Its effectiveness in identifying potential security issues and providing information that was used in the development of admissibility recommendations.

2.2.1 Efficiency

In assessing efficiency, the evaluation looked at:

• Whether screening targets were met; and
• The costs associated with conducting the screenings.

Degree to Which Screening Targets Were Met

As mentioned previously, the pilot was designed with the intent of conducting enhanced screening on 40% of claimants in both 2013/14 and 2014/15.^{Footnote 12} In fiscal year 2013/14, 38% of claims were sent to the RCMP for screening, close to the 40% target (Table 2.5).

Source: CIC Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014; RCMP-SIBS data.

During this time period, the RCMP completed 88% of the screening requests sent by the CBSA (Table 2.6).

Source: CIC Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014; RCMP-SIBS data.

Note that the screening of some claims sent to the RCMP in one quarter would have been completed in a subsequent quarter.

Factors Affecting the Screening Process

While the target of 40% was close to being met and the vast majority of screenings were completed, interviewees identified issues related to the screening process that could have impeded its overall efficiency:

• RCMP interviewees noted that the ability to conduct the screening is dependent upon the completeness and accuracy of the data provided to them by the CBSA. ^*** These issues were identified as having an impact on the efficiency with which the RCMP can complete the screening process, as the lack of this information can be a prompt for requests for further information (i.e., application form and schedule), which delays the screening process. With respect to the accuracy of the data provided, RCMP interviewees noted that incorrect information resulted in inefficiencies, as they were obliged to conduct the screening with the information provided, even in the case of obvious typographical errors.
• The RCMP provided negative screening results based on the information initially provided in a minority of cases (18.24%). In cases where the RCMP and its partners proceeded further with the LERC process, SIBS requested a scanned copy of the asylum claimant's intake form, including the applicant's signed consent form.^{Footnote 13} Some interview respondents stated that this approach, rather than asking for this information to be included with the screening request, was undertaken in order to comply with privacy considerations. However, this added a step to the process, and introduced a challenge to the RCMP's ability to provide screening results in a timely manner. The feasibility of sending copies of the intake form at the onset was suggested but was not pursued, as it was determined that this would require additional resources.
• The lack of an automated IT system to transmit screening information from the CBSA to the RCMP (see Section 2.1.3), was also considered by interviewees to have had an impact on the efficiency of the screening process. The process currently used requires the manipulation of data into various formats in order to complete the screening process, which extends the amount of time required to complete the screening process, as well as reducing the resources available to support the pilot.
• In conducting the screening, the RCMP depends upon other law enforcement agencies to provide information. The speed at which this information is provided is in turn dependent upon the capacity of the law enforcement agencies and respecting their other priorities,^{Footnote 14} and is therefore outside the control of the RCMP (see Section 2.2.2 for additional information on factors affecting the timeliness of screenings). The uncertainty regarding when results will be provided by RCMP partners creates a challenge in managing workloads, which has an effect on program delivery efficiency.
• Other inefficiencies were noted in connection with the reporting of information collected. In 31.38% of cases, the CBSA proceeded with its FESS determination in the absence of screening information from the pilot (see Section 2.2.2 for further discussion). Although CBSA interviewees indicated that they felt comfortable risk-managing these cases, the CBSA did not notify the RCMP when this occurred. As a result, RCMP and partner law-enforcement agency resources continued to be expended pursuing information with no applicability. Interviewees also mentioned that at times, the RCMP forwarded information that was already contained in CBSA holdings, resulting in a duplication of effort.

Costs Associated with Conducting Screenings

Resources

Within the RCMP, 27.5 FTEs were dedicated to the screening process, while one other FTE was dedicated to the policy aspects of the pilot.^{Footnote 15} This is slightly below the 30 FTEs that were originally intended.

The planned FTE count was based on receiving 9,000 screening requests per year, which is much higher than the actual number of requests for screenings received (3,132 in 2013/14). While the volume of work is lower than intended, RCMP interviewees indicated it would have been difficult to achieve this target with the intended number of resources, due to the amount of time required to complete a screening.

Expenditures

Total expenditures to date are below the funding levels provided for the pilot (Table 2.7).

Source: CIC-MACAD, July 2014.

Cost Per Screening

Planning documents estimated the per-unit cost of conducting a screening by the RCMP at $425. While the reasonability of the estimated cost was not assessed, a review of financial information found that, while the average actual cost per screening during the 2013/14 fiscal year was $1,026, the cost decreased in each quarter, from a high of $1,207 in Q1 to $886 in Q4 (Table 2.8). It is possible that the difference between the anticipated and actual cost per screening is a result of the complexity and resource-intensiveness of conducting enhanced screenings, which may not have been fully appreciated during the planning stage as well as the challenges previously identified with respect to the screening process.

2.2.2 Effectiveness

The evaluation looked at the degree to which the pilot:

• Resulted in the identification of potential criminality matters in a timely fashion; and
• Had an impact on admissibility recommendations put forward by the CBSA.

Identification of potential criminality matters in a timely fashion

Administrative data reveal that, between January 1, 2013 and June 30 2014, over 4,000 screenings were conducted. The results are provided in Table 2.9.

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

Of the 4,085 claims subjected to enhanced screening through the pilot project, a total of 85 claims produced positive findings of concern (2.08%). Of the 4,000 claims where no potential criminality matters were identified, 3,340 (81.76%) were concluded using the information initially provided, and the other 660 (16.16%) required the request and receipt of further claimant information from the CBSA.

According to RCMP interviewees, from a risk perspective, while the likelihood of useful information being provided may be low, the impact could potentially be high. While administrative data was not available to compare the results with other similar screening programs, RCMP interviewees who were familiar with other screening programs estimated that the percentage of positive results varied between 1% and 5%, suggesting that the 2% result was not unexpected.

The amount of time taken to provide information and results from the enhanced screening is important, in that a claimant's hearing at the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) cannot proceed until the FESS process is completed. The scheduling of a hearing was legislated following the reforms to the in-Canada asylum system as follows:

• 90% of Designated Country of Origin (DCO)^{Footnote 16} inland claims are to be scheduled for an RPD hearing within 30 days of intake;
• 90% of DCO POE claims are to be scheduled within 45 days; and
• 90% of non-DCO claims are to be scheduled within 60 days.

Given the importance of the hearing process to the success of the overall in-Canada asylum system, data was collected on how often FESS processes impede the ability to schedule hearings within the required timeframes. The established target was that 80% of FESS processes should be completed 5 days prior to the RPD hearing date in order to avoid a postponement. Due to the complexity of the security screening process, when the FESS process cannot be completed on time for the scheduled hearing, a postponement of up to three to four months on average is issued. In cases where the FESS is pending after six months, the IRB may proceed with the hearing unless the CBSA requests a change in date and time.^{Footnote 17}

Evidence from the RCC suggests that, although this target was met, FESS delays represent one of the main reasons for delays in holding RPD hearings within the legislated timeframes. As the RCMP screening is one component of the FESS, the timeliness of the pilot screening was examined.

The administrative data reveal that the time taken to provide the results of the screening varied by screening outcome (Table 2.10).

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

On average, 21.48 days were required to complete the RCMP screening, but this varied depending upon the result of the screening. In cases where a positive result was obtained (i.e. where adverse information was found), an average of 95 days were required to complete the screening process. For negative results (i.e., no adverse information was found), the time taken depended on whether further information was required in order to conduct the screening. In cases where no further information was required, the screening took an average of 16.37 days; in cases where further information was required, an average of 37.85 days on average were required.

Note that the number of days to complete the RCMP security check was higher in cases where further information was required, which was the case for all positive LERCs and for 16.50% of all negative LERCs. Interviewees noted that the process for requesting additional claimant information was developed during implementation (see Section 2.2.1), and that this affected the timeliness of the screening process.

Another factor affecting the time taken by the RCMP to provide enhanced screening results to CBSA is that positive LERC reports are only prepared after written third-party release has been obtained from the originating law enforcement agency and they have provided or approved the summary, which is beyond the control of the RCMP.

Given the tight timelines associated with hearings based on the country of origin of the claimant, the evaluation looked at the time taken to complete the enhanced screening by DCO status (Table 2.11).

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

The table shows that, on average, screening results were provided within the established timeframes for all DCO statuses. This is the result of the high proportion of cases where no criminality matter was identified, and no further information was requested in order to help arrive at this determination. However, the average of 95 days taken to return positive screening results (Table 2.9) suggests that the level of effort associated to these instances is greater and that the information about claimants of concern may not have been provided soon enough to meet the established timelines for holding hearings.

One other measure of whether the information from the enhanced screenings was provided in a timely manner is the degree to which FESS determinations were made in the absence of enhanced screening results. Interviewees from CBSA indicated that, at times, they "risk managed", i.e., proceeded with the overall FESS recommendation, in the absence of the RCMP screening's findings. Although the details as to how these instances were risk managed is outside of scope, CBSA interviewees felt this approach was reasonable. The administrative data shows the extent to which the FESS determination was made before the enhanced screening was completed or its results provided to the CBSA, by screening result (Table 2.12).

Source: Refugee Claimant Continuum, August 2014.

The data show that the FESS process was concluded before RCMP results were received in 1,282 cases (31.38%) of all screened cases.^{Footnote 18} As expected, the proportion of late results was higher for cases resulting in positive identification of causes for concern (36.47%), and even higher for cases where no causes for concern were ultimately identified after having requested further information (45.15%). The evidence suggests that, although the pilot was, on average, able to provide screening results within the established timelines, this information was not considered for 1,282 cases by the FESS process.

Impact of the RCMP screening results on admissibility recommendations put forward by the CBSA

Of the 85 cases where adverse information was identified by the RCMP, there were 31 instances where RCMP results were not taken into consideration and of the remaining 54 cases, 2 (3.7%) resulted in an unfavourable recommendation in the front-end security screening (FESS) conducted by CBSA.

A review of these 2 cases resulting in an unfavourable recommendation found that the information provided by the RCMP although timely did not feed into the admissibility assessment made by the CBSA as the information was not consistent with the criteria used to assess admissibility. As well, a review of a sample of the other 83 cases where the RCMP identified adverse information revealed that the information provided was either already available through other sources, was not related to the FESS mandate (i.e. information that pertains to Sections 34, 35 or 37 of the IRPA), or was not needed as a result of the claim being withdrawn prior to the completion of the assessment.

The administrative data review further revealed that the percentage of cases where a FESS recommendation was non-favourable due to organized criminality issues did not differ noticeably based on whether or not the RCMP screening was undertaken (when pending cases were excluded from the calculation). The percentage of cases where a non-favourable FESS recommendation was put forward for organized criminality reasons was similar to those cases that were not screened by the RCMP.

Subsequent to the conduct of the evaluation, a follow-up on the status of the 85 cases where adverse information was identified by the RCMP revealed that, although two cases resulted in an unfavourable CBSA FESS recommendation, 42% (36 out of the 85 cases) of the cases were eventually denied by the IRB and an additional 12% (10 out of the 85 cases) were withdrawn or abandoned.^{Footnote 19}

While the data indicate that, to date, the results of the RCMP screening have not had a significant impact on admissibility recommendations put forward by the CBSA, interviewees felt that barriers to information-sharing, including the third-party rule,^{Footnote 20} may be preventing the disclosure of information that could increase the usefulness of the screening results. At the time of the evaluation, discussions were underway between the RCMP and CBSA in order to determine whether additional information may be shared in order to increase its usefulness in making admissibility recommendations.

In addition, RCMP interviewees noted the lack of systematic feedback mechanisms at the operational level between the RCMP and CBSA regarding the results of the screening and how the information is used. It was felt that the lack of feedback limited the potential for improvements to be made to current approaches and processes.

Lastly, interviewees indicated that communication gaps have resulted in a lack of understanding of what types of information can be used in making admissibility recommendations, given current requirements under the IRPA and the United Nations Convention and Protocol on Refugees. The difference in the type of information provided by the RCMP versus the information sought by CBSA was raised as an issue by interviewees from both the RCMP and the CBSA. RCMP interviewees questioned why the CBSA was not using information related to certain aspects of criminality when making admissibility recommendations, as it was felt this information was relevant to consider. CBSA interviewees were of the opinion that the scope of the screening undertaken by the RCMP was to focus solely on Section 37 and therefore much of the information provided by the RCMP was deemed to be not relevant in the assessment of admissibility. This lack of communication resulted in the collection and forwarding of some information that could not be used given the diverging interpretations of the requirements under IRPA, resulting in operational inefficiencies.

2.3 Relevance

The evaluation assessed the following issues related to relevance:

• The need to conduct the RCMP screening;
• The pilot's alignment with RCMP and government-wide priorities; and
• The degree to which the screening is aligned with the federal and legislative obligations of the RCMP.

2.3.1 Need to Conduct the RCMP Screening

Under the previous refugee determination system, applicants could be in Canada for several years before going before the IRB and could have engaged in serious criminal activity. The pilot project was established to address a perceived gap in the security screening of in-country refugee applicants which could potentially expose Canada to public safety risks. The rationale for the project was that, without adequate screening, persons who were inadmissible under the provisions of the IRPA would continue to remain in Canada, threatening the integrity of the In-Canada Asylum System. The pilot project was intended to partially address this gap in security screening by conducting more thorough security screening on a portion of refugee claims.

The rationale for the pilot also arose as a result of a series of reports by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG), as well as previous RCMP experience in providing security screenings for partner departments and agencies. In a 2004 report on Canadian national security, the OAG noted deficiencies in the screening of airport personnel, and recommended that the RCMP and Transport Canada consider additional sharing of police intelligence information on criminal associations of applicants for, and holders of, clearances to restricted areas at airports.^{Footnote 21} In response to this recommendation, the RCMP and Transport Canada developed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on information-sharing supporting the Transportation Security Clearance Program.^{Footnote 22} In a follow-up report in 2009, the OAG recommended that Transport Canada and the RCMP increase efforts to share information on individuals who have applied for security clearance to work at airports.^{Footnote 23}

The 2004 and 2009 OAG report excerpts above centre on the RCMP screening of Transport Canada employees, but also relate to the broader issue of information sharing. This theme was continued in a 2011 report by the OAG, which recommended that "the Canada Border Services Agency ensure that all information that can be obtained from security partners and is relevant to security screening is used to provide advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada."^{Footnote 24} The OAG reports provide a rationale for sharing information to support the conduct of security screening.

The RCMP delivers the screening, drawing upon domestic law-enforcement databases whose contents are not available to either the CBSA or CIC. In this regard, it is addressing the 2011 OAG recommendation to ensure that information is made available. The review of cases undertaken as part of this evaluation, however, reveals that the information contained in the databases has not, to date, been of use in supporting admissibility recommendations. In addition, some interviewees suggested that relevant information would be available in the absence of the pilot, noting primarily the existing screening of fingerprints for criminal record matches by the RCMP, as well as the screening undertaken by the CBSA.

The databases used by the RCMP to conduct the screening contain domestic information on individuals. As such, the information is more likely to be of use in situations where a claimant has been in the country for a longer period of time. Given the short period between the time an individual makes an asylum claim and their hearing at the Immigration Refugee Board (which varies between 30, 45 and 60 days, depending on where the claim was made and the claimant's country of origin), changes were made in the selection of claimants to be screened to focus on claims made at inland offices, as they were believed to be more likely to include individuals who have been in the country a longer period of time. Even though this change was made during the pilot, some interviewees were still not certain that applicants would have been in Canada long enough for these databases to contain information that could be used when formulating admissibility recommendations.

While results to date are limited, RCMP interviewees mentioned that, from a law enforcement perspective, conducting security checks is considered an integral part of the due diligence process and should not be assessed solely based on the number of times adverse information is identified. When compared with the cost of investigations, trials and incarceration, screening is considered to be both cost-efficient and cost-effective. RCMP interviewees also indicated that, from a risk perspective, while the likelihood of useful information being available may be low, the impact is considered to potentially be high.

While the OAG reports and RCMP interviewees stressed the importance of sharing information between partners to enhance screening processes, the information shared must be relevant. Based on the assessments above of the information provided, the current approach does not appear to provide much by way of relevant information to support the admissibility screening of refugee claimants given current requirements under IRPA.

2.3.2 Alignment with RCMP and Government-Wide Priorities

The evaluation looked at:

• The alignment of the enhanced screening pilot's objectives with the RCMP's strategic outcomes and priorities; and
• The alignment of the enhanced screening pilot's objectives with Government of Canada and partner department priorities.

Alignment with RCMP strategic outcomes and priorities

The enhanced screening pilot aligns with the RCMP strategic outcome "criminal activity affecting Canadians is reduced." Within RCMP programming, the pilot aligns with the sub-program 1.1.2 (federal policing), as well as with the expected result "Canada's borders are protected from criminality."^{Footnote 25}

RCMP interviewees also felt that the screening pilot was aligned with the organization's priorities. Specifically, they suggested that the pilot helped contribute to departmental priorities such as ensuring safe homes and communities, combating organized crime, and protecting national security.

Alignment with Government of Canada and partner department priorities

The enhanced screening pilot is a component of reforms to the In-Canada Asylum System. Reforms to this system were identified as a Government of Canada priority in the March 2010 Speech from the Throne.^{Footnote 26} The continued commitment to successful refugee system reforms was indicated in the October 2013 Speech from the Throne, which included an update on actions taken to date.^{Footnote 27} The pilot also aligns with the overall Government of Canada priority for "a safe and secure Canada."^{Footnote 28}

The pilot is also aligned with the strategic outcomes of delivery partners, as identified in their respective Reports on Plans and Priorities:

• CBSA: international trade and travel is facilitated across Canada's border and Canada's population is protected from border-related risks;^{Footnote 29} and
• CIC: family and humanitarian migration that reunites families and offers protection to the displaced and persecuted.^{Footnote 30}

Although not all interviewees provided answers to questions on the pilot's alignment with departmental priorities, those who responded suggested that the pilot was in alignment. CBSA interviewees believed that the pilot was successfully aligned with departmental priorities related to national security. CIC interviewees noted the alignment of the pilot with departmental priorities related to protecting and improving the program integrity of the refugee determination system.

2.3.3 Alignment with the federal and legislative obligations of the RCMP

The evaluation looked at the degree to which the objectives of the screening pilot aligned with the legislative and federal obligations of the RCMP.

The enhanced screening pilot project aligns with the legislative and regulatory authorities of the RCMP, as detailed in Section 18 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, which includes as part of the duties listed "the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada."^{Footnote 31} The pilot also builds upon previous RCMP experience in providing screening services for the federal government, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the RCMP and Transport Canada to provide relevant information on individuals applying for employment at airports, including information on organized crime and criminal associations, and the MOU between the RCMP and CIC signed in March 2012 for the screening of applicants seeking to enter Canada or apply for Canadian citizenship. In this MOU, the RCMP agrees to "conduct screening, on behalf of CIC, by way of checking the personal information received from CIC pertaining to an individual against designated databases held by, or accessible to, the RCMP." The enhanced screening pilot is in keeping with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the MOU.

Interviewees noted that the RCMP was uniquely well-suited to carry out the screening function outlined in the pilot, as the RCMP has access, through their legislated authorities and status as a law enforcement agency, to databases containing information that is not available to other organizations.

3.0 Conclusions

Performance

The evaluation found that the pilot was implemented as intended in that the RCMP established a process within its organization to screen a portion of refugee claimants within existing law enforcement databases. By reprofiling funds in response to changes to the coming-into-force of the new ICAS, the RCMP was able to deliver the pilot within the assigned resource levels. Both the actual expenditures to date and the number of staff engaged to support the pilot have been lower than anticipated allowances. While the complexity of the screening process and challenges with respect to the exchange of information resulted in the actual cost being higher than the estimated cost per screening of $425 established at the outset of the pilot, the actual cost per screening declined over time, from $1,207 in Q1 of 2013/14 to $886 in Q4 of 2013/14.

The evaluation also found that a number of issues have served to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the pilot. Chief amongst these was a lack of consensus regarding the types of admissibility information sought through the screening exercise. This resulted in a lack of shared understanding of the intended focus of the pilot and awareness of the types of information that can be used in making admissibility recommendations. The RCMP was screening and reporting on law enforcement categories of concern, including security, human rights violations, serious criminality and organized crime.

Another key issue concerned problems in transmitting and receiving files to be screened, owing to the receipt of incomplete or inaccurate information, the need to request further information before screening could be conducted, and the lack of an automated IT system to transmit screening information. These factors contributed to difficulties in providing meaningful screening results in a timely manner. As well, the RCMP's reliance on other law enforcement agencies to provide information resulted in some delays that were beyond their control. As a result, CBSA elected to make FESS decisions in the absence of RCMP data for approximately 30% of the cases screened.

During the period reviewed, approximately 4,000 screenings were conducted, resulting in the identification of positive findings of concern in 2% of screened cases. From a risk perspective, it is unlikely that useful information pursuant to the requirements of IRPA will surface from domestic law enforcement databases on claimants who have been in country for 1-2 months. Accordingly, to date, the results of the RCMP screening have not had an impact on admissibility recommendations put forward by the CBSA.

Relevance

The evaluation found that the Enhanced Screening Pilot Project is aligned with the priorities and strategic outcomes of the RCMP, delivery partner departments, and the Government of Canada. The screening conducted through the pilot project is within the roles and responsibilities of the federal government, and the RCMP is the appropriate federal government entity to conduct this screening.

However, given the difficulties encountered during the implementation of the pilot, the short period of time during which the pilot has been functioning, and the limited use of screening results in assessing admissibility based on IRPA requirements, it is not clear to what extent the RCMP screening process, as currently implemented, contributes to admissibility recommendations, and to maintaining the integrity of the refugee determination system.

Annex A – Evaluation Matrix

Annex B – List of Documents

Government of Canada

• Balanced Refugee Reform Act, S.C. 2010, c. 8.
• Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
• Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012, c. 17.
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10.
• Response to the Seventeenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts – National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing, 2009.
• Speech from the Throne to open the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament of Canada, 2010.
• Speech from the Throne to open the Second Session of the Forty-First Parliament of Canada, 2013.

Canada Border Services Agency

• "Admissibility," 2013
• Front End Security Screening: Standard Operating Procedures, 2013
• National Security Screening: Program Profile (undated)
• Report on Plans and Priorities, 2013-14.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada

• Backgrounder, "Overview of Canada's New Refugee System," 2012.
• "Designated Countries of Origin," 2013.
• Metrics of Success Pre-Reform Benchmarking Report, 2013.
• Performance Measurement Strategy for the New Refugee Status Determination System, revised 2012.
• Report on Plans and Priorities, 2013-14.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

• Memorandum of Understanding between Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2012.
• Memorandum of Understanding establishing an administrative framework for the promotion of cooperation and mutual assistance between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canada Border Services Agency, 2014.
• Report on Plans and Priorities, 2013-14.
• Refugee Reform Pilot Program Quality Assurance Reviews, 2013, 2014(1), 2014(2).

Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada

• Federal Court, 2009. Charkaoui (Re), 2009 FC 476, [2010] 3 F.C.R. 102.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

• 2004 March Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 3: National Security in Canada – The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative.
• 2009 March Status Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 1: National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing.
• 2011 Fall Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 2: Issuing Visas.

Transport Canada

• "Institutional Functions, Programs and Activities," 2013.

Treasury Board

• Policy on Evaluation, 2009.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat

• Directive on the Evaluation Function, 2009.
• Guide to Preparing Treasury Board Submissions, Appendix B: Costing Tables, 2007.
• "Whole-of-government framework," 2014.

United Nations

• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1967. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Annex C – Interview Guides

Interview Guide – Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Foreword

Citizenship and Immigration Canada's (CIC) Research and Evaluation Division, in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Program Evaluation Services (NPES), are conducting an evaluation of the RCMP Security Screening Pilot Project. The requirement for an evaluation stems from a Treasury Board requirement to evaluate the pilot project in support of the new in-Canada asylum system.

As part of this evaluation, the CIC Evaluation Division is conducting interviews with selected individuals who have been involved with the project. The purpose of the interviews is to obtain perspectives on how the pilot project was implemented, its continued relevance, and its performance.

The following questions will serve as a guide for our interview. In some cases, questions may not be relevant to your particular situation or experience. The interview will focus on those questions most relevant to you. Please note that responses to interview questions will be presented in aggregate form in the evaluation report.

Background

1. Please briefly describe your role and responsibilities with respect to the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project.

Pilot Implementation

2. Has the enhanced screening pilot project been implemented as originally intended?
   1. Are you aware of any changes in the timing of the pilot project implementation, compared to the planned timeline?
   2. Are you aware of any changes in the resources assigned to the pilot project, compared to the planned levels?
   3. Are you aware of any changes to the screening process, compared to the planned process?
   4. Are you aware of any changes to the screening criteria, compared to the planned criteria?
3. Is the CBSA able to successfully send applicant requests to the RCMP? Have there been any challenges?
4. Is the RCMP able to successfully process requests for enhanced screening? Have there been any challenges?
5. Is the RCMP able to successfully report on assessments to the CBSA? To CIC? Have there been any challenges?
6. Do you have any other comments concerning the implementation of the enhanced screening pilot project?

Communications

7. Are roles and responsibilities for the RCMP and program partners clearly understood and followed?
8. What mechanisms are in place to ensure communication between the RCMP and program partners regarding the enhanced screening pilot project?
9. What tools are in place to assist in the delivery of the pilot? Are these tools sufficient? What else, if anything, would be helpful?

Performance

10. Is the enhanced RCMP screening an effective means of identifying security or criminality issues among the target population?
11. Has the enhanced screening pilot project provided information that would not otherwise have been available?
12. Has information provided through the enhanced screening pilot project been delivered in a timely manner (i.e., are service standards being met)? Why or why not?
13. Can you think of any ways in which the pilot project could have been implemented more efficiently?

Relevance

14. What was the rationale for establishing the enhanced screening pilot project? Given your experiences with the pilot, does that rationale still hold?
15. Do you find the objectives of the enhanced screening pilot project to be aligned with the RCMP's strategic outcomes and priorities? Why or why not?
16. Do you have any other comments concerning the relevance of the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project?
17. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Interview Guide – Canada Border Services Agency

Foreword

Citizenship and Immigration Canada's (CIC) Research and Evaluation Division, in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Program Evaluation Services (NPES), are conducting an evaluation of the RCMP Security Screening Pilot Project. The requirement for an evaluation stems from a Treasury Board requirement to evaluate the pilot project in support of the new in-Canada asylum system.

As part of this evaluation, the CIC Evaluation Division is conducting interviews with selected individuals who have been involved with the project. The purpose of the interviews is to obtain perspectives on how the pilot project was implemented, its continued relevance, and its performance.

The following questions will serve as a guide for our interview. In some cases, questions may not be relevant to your particular situation or experience. The interview will focus on those questions most relevant to you. Please note that responses to interview questions will be presented in aggregate form in the evaluation report.

Background

1. Please briefly describe your role and responsibilities with respect to the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project.

Pilot Implementation

2. Has the enhanced screening pilot project been implemented as originally intended? If not, what has changed and what was the rationale for these changes?
3. Is the CBSA able to successfully send applicant requests to the RCMP? Have there been any challenges?
4. Is the RCMP able to successfully process requests for enhanced screening? Have there been any challenges?
5. Is the RCMP able to successfully report on assessments to the CBSA? Have there been any challenges?
6. Do you have any other comments concerning the implementation of the enhanced screening pilot project?

Communications

7. Are roles and responsibilities of the program partners (CBSA, CIC, RCMP) clearly understood and followed?
8. What mechanisms are in place to ensure communication between the RCMP and program partners regarding the enhanced screening pilot project?
9. What tools are in place to assist in the delivery of the pilot? Are these tools sufficient? What else, if anything, would be helpful?

Performance (Efficiency and Resource Utilization)

10. Is the enhanced RCMP screening an effective means of identifying security or criminality issues among the target population?
11. Has the enhanced screening pilot project provided information that would not otherwise have been available?
12. Is the information provided through screening useful and relevant? Why or why not?
13. Has information provided through the enhanced screening pilot project been delivered in a timely manner? Why or why not?
14. Can you think of any ways in which the pilot project could have been implemented more efficiently?

Relevance

15. What was the rationale for establishing the enhanced screening pilot project? Given your experiences with the pilot, does that rationale still hold?
16. Do you find the objectives of the enhanced screening pilot project to be aligned with the mandates, strategic outcomes, and priorities of the CBSA? Why or why not?
17. Do you have any other comments concerning the relevance of the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project?
18. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Interview Guide – Citizenship and Immigration Canada

Foreword

Citizenship and Immigration Canada's (CIC) Research and Evaluation Division, in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Program Evaluation Services (NPES), are conducting an evaluation of the RCMP Security Screening Pilot Project. The requirement for an evaluation stems from a Treasury Board requirement to evaluate the pilot project in support of the new in-Canada asylum system.

As part of this evaluation, the CIC Evaluation Division is conducting interviews with selected individuals who have been involved with the project. The purpose of the interviews is to obtain perspectives on how the pilot project was implemented, its continued relevance, and its performance.

The following questions will serve as a guide for our interview. In some cases, questions may not be relevant to your particular situation or experience. The interview will focus on those questions most relevant to you. Please note that responses to interview questions will be presented in aggregate form in the evaluation report.

Background

1. Please briefly describe your role and responsibilities with respect to the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project.

Relevance

2. What was the rationale for establishing the enhanced screening pilot project? Given your experiences with the pilot, does that rationale still hold?
3. Do you find the objectives of the enhanced screening pilot project to be aligned with the mandates, strategic outcomes, and priorities of CIC? Why or why not?
4. Do you have any other comments concerning the relevance of the RCMP enhanced screening pilot project?

Pilot Implementation

5. Has the enhanced screening pilot project been implemented as originally intended? If not, what has changed and what was the rationale for these changes?
6. Is the RCMP able to successfully process requests for enhanced screening? Have there been any challenges? Are targets being met?
7. Is the RCMP able to successfully report on assessments to CIC? Have there been any challenges?
8. Do you have any other comments concerning the implementation of the enhanced screening pilot project?

Communications

9. Are roles and responsibilities of the RCMP and program partners clearly understood and followed?
10. What mechanisms are in place to ensure communication between the RCMP and program partners regarding the enhanced screening pilot project?

Performance (Efficiency and Resource Utilization)

11. Is the enhanced RCMP screening an effective means of identifying security or criminality issues among the target population?
12. Has the enhanced screening pilot project provided information that would not otherwise have been available?
13. Is the information provided through screening useful and relevant? Why or why not?
14. Has information provided through the enhanced screening pilot project been delivered in a timely manner? Why or why not?
15. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Date modified:

2016-03-10